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The Rhetoric of the Fourth Amendment:
Toward a More Persuasive Fourth
Amendment
Timothy C. MacDonnell
Abstract
In the last forty-five years, the United States Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been under siege. As early as
1971 one of the Court’s own members, Justice Harlan, stated there
were “serious distortions and incongruities” in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment case law. Since Justice Harlan’s criticism numerous
scholars have echoed his dissatisfaction, calling the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence “unstable and unconvincing,” a “tarbaby,” and “a mass of contradiction and obscurity.” The Court itself
seems as unconvinced by its own Fourth Amendment case law as
the academic community. In 1967 the Court appeared to have
placed the final nail in the trespass doctrine’s coffin, only to
resurrect the theory in 2012. Between the 1980s and 2000s, the
Court significantly altered the contours of the search incident to
arrest doctrine with regard to automobiles. In 2006 the Randolph
Court created the rule that one resident’s decision to permit police
to search a home may not overrule another resident’s decision to
prevent the search. Approximately eight years later, the Fernandez
Court limited the applicability of the Randolph Court’s rule to such
an extent as to make it virtually irrelevant.
The focus of this Article is on why many Fourth Amendment
opinions are unconvincing. To answer this question, I analyze
various Fourth Amendment opinions by the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court between 2005 and today. I examine and
evaluate the persuasiveness of the Court’s Fourth Amendment
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jurisprudence through the lens of classical rhetoric. Opinions are
assessed based on three areas of persuasion: appeals to logic (logos);
appeals to emotion (pathos); and appeals to credibility (ethos). By
examining the Justices’ opinions in this fashion, patterns of
unpersuasive opinion writing emerge. While a common source for
all unpersuasive opinions is not available, common patterns of
weak persuasion in particular appeals do exist. Weak appeals to
ethos commonly stem from Justices failing to fully confront the
doctrine of stare decisis. Weak pathos-based appeals often involve
Justices engaging in misplaced emotive arguments, where a Justice
seeks to persuade by appealing to emotions that are disconnected
from the Fourth Amendment or the facts of the case. Logically weak
arguments usually include one or more logical fallacies. Misplaced
pathos appeals and weak logos appeals often leave readers with the
sense that these flaws stem from poorly disguised outcome-directed
opinions. Any opinion written in this fashion runs the risk of
appearing like an elaborate rationalization and thereby being
unconvincing.
Additionally,
I
assert
that
apparent
outcome-directed judicial opinions, particularly Supreme Court
decisions, violate one of the core principles of classical and modern
rhetoric— that persuasive speech should be modified to account for
the expectations of an audience.
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I. Introduction
On June 25, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Riley v. California,1 in which it held that cell phones
are safe from warrantless governmental searches incident to an
arrest.2 In newspapers throughout the country, the decision was
declared a great victory for privacy3 and, at least in this case, the

1. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
2. See id. at 2495 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to in arrest is accordingly simple—get a
warrant.”).
3. See Supreme Court: Warrant Needed to Search Cellphones, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/supreme-court-warrantneeded-to-search-cellphones-20140625/ (last visited on Dec. 15, 2016) (stating
that the Court’s decision was “a strong defense of digital age privacy”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0; Rule Cellphone
Search
Needs
a
Warrant,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
25,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-cellphones-search-privacy.
html (last visited on Dec. 15, 2016) (calling the ruling “a sweeping victory for
privacy rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); High Court
Defends
Personal
Privacy,
MERCURY
NEWS
(June
25,
2014),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/06/25/high-court-defends-personal-privacy/
(last visited Dec. 10, 2016) (calling the decision an “emphatic defense”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

1872

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016)

Justices of the Court were declared wise.4 While all true, there is
more to be found in the Riley decision than just cell phone privacy.5
Scholars and judges have observed that judicial opinions are
“performative utterances . . . an expression that is not only
articulated but also operative.”6 Senior Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
observed that “a court’s public performance in reaching a
conclusion is at least as important as the conclusion.”7 The
Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion, acknowledging
that how the Court explains its decision is often as important as
the ruling itself.8 When it comes to the Supreme Court, a pleasing
result in a case is not, in and of itself, enough to declare it “a good
opinion.”9 Nor is it enough that a concurrence or dissent supports
the conclusion we may find prudent.
4. See Editorial, Court Wisely Protects Cellphones from Searches, BOS.
GLOBE (June 27, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/06
/26/court-wisely-protects-cellphones-from-searches/bo2HCPjgTz4PwUjUa1VI5M
/story.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (approving of the Court’s decision) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Editorial, The Supreme Court Saves
Cellphone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/
opinion/the-supreme-court-saves-cellphone-privacy.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2016) (expressing gratitude at the Court’s ruling) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
5. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Google Glass While Driving, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 755, 792–93 (2015) (noting that a search of a driver’s Google Glass would be
impermissible under Riley’s search incident arrest doctrine); Laurie Buchan
Serafino, Note, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The
Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party
Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 205 (2014) (arguing that Riley’s standard
should apply to data stored in clouds).
6. Dist. Council 47, Am. Fed. of State, County and Mun. Emp.’s v. Bradley,
795 F.2d 310, 320 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J. dissenting); see also Pintip
Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493, 499 (2003) (noting that judges’ speech
must be performative in order to make law).
7. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 66 (3d ed. 1997).
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (“Thus, the
Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be
accepted by the Nation.”).
9. See infra Part III.A.2.a (noting that although the Supreme Court denied
a warrantless search in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2005), the opinion
had limited practical effect).
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A “good opinion” is expected to be many things. We expect it
to be grounded in logic, to be clearly stated, and to credibly account
for the impact of prior Court rulings.10 We also expect the opinion
to demonstrate practical wisdom, thereby creating rules that will
work in the “real world.”11 Additionally, the Court must be attuned
to the intense emotions stirred by Fourth Amendment questions
when balancing between privacy and security.12 In short, the
decision must be persuasive. Persuasive opinions enhance the
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public, law enforcement,
and lower courts.13 More importantly, persuasive opinions lay deep
roots that grow over time, creating whole new subcategories of
constitutional law.14 Over time, a particularly persuasive
concurrence or dissent can outpace a majority opinion and become
the new rule of law. Finally, persuasive opinions are more likely to
be enforced broadly and consistently by lower courts, rather than
being limited to the facts of the opinion or misinterpreted because

10. See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide For
Novel, Experienced, and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 102 (stating that
courts must consider precedent and use precise language in creating binding
authority).
11. See Melissa Murray, Real-Life Effects of Court Rulings Should Matter as
Well as the Law, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/26/thesupreme-court-meets-the-real-world/real-life-effects-of-court-rulings-should-matteras-well-as-the-law (last updated Mar. 18, 2016) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016)
(arguing that courts should consider real-world consequences when reaching
decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that many innocent people are subjected to unconstitutional
searches).
13. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (“Unlike the
legislature or the executive, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either the sword
or the purse’ . . . so its authority depends in large measure on the public’s
willingness to respect and follow its decisions.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton))); see also Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court
Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (2000) (“Without opinions, lower courts
and other government officials would be faced with a set of holdings that,
separately or together, could be taken to stand for any number of different legal
rules.”).
14. See, e.g., Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization
of Jackson’s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
665, 667 (2009) (noting that Justice Jackson’s classification of executive power
into three parts “dominated subsequent separation of powers jurisprudence”).
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the decision is illogical or just wrong.15 Riley v. California is a
persuasive opinion.16
It could be argued that the persuasiveness of Riley is a matter
of no great significance. For one, the Justices of the Supreme Court
possess some of the finest legal minds in the country.17 Further, at
the heart of what it is to be a lawyer is the art and science of
persuasion.18 Therefore, all Supreme Court decisions should be
persuasive, and it should not come as a great surprise that Riley
is. Of course, this is not the case with all Supreme Court opinions.19
The Supreme Court’s post-Katz Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has been vigorously criticized. It has been described
as “arbitrary, unpredictable and often border[ing] on incoherent,”20
“a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely
complex and contradictory, but often perverse,”21 and “a mass of
15. See Kyle Nelson, Comment, Florida v. Jardines: A Shortsighted View of
the Fourth Amendment, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 415, 426 (2013) (noting that Jardines
“solidified an inadaptable standard, leaving the jurisprudence unsettled and
ensuring that future cases will not be ‘easy’”).
16. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Symposium, Surprising Unanimity,
Even More Surprising Clarity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014). But see generally
Leslie A. Shoebotham, The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident Consequences of
Making an Easy Case Simple, 75 LA. L. REV. 29 (2014) (arguing that Riley stands
for a dramatic shift in the Court’s search incident to arrest line of cases).
17. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., J.D.–Harvard Law School ’79; The
Late Justice Antonin Scalia, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’60; Justice Anthony
Kennedy, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’61; Justice Clarence Thomas, J.D.–Yale
Law School ’74; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, LL.B.–Columbia Law School ’59;
Justice Steven Breyer, LL.B.–Harvard Law School ’64; Justice Samuel Alito, Jr.,
J.D.–Yale Law School ’75; Justice Sonia Sotomayor, J.D.–Yale Law School ’79;
Justice Elena Kagan, J.D.–Harvard Law School ’86.
18. RONALD WAICUKAUSKI, PAUL M. SANDLER & JOANNE EPPS, THE 12
SECRETS OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT, at v (2009) (“The essence that the great
advocate adds to fact and law is an assessment of their implications for her client’s
case, and an understanding of the way that the facts and law support her overall
rationale.”).
19. See infra Part III.A.1.b (noting that Justice Scalia’s use of precedent in
United States v. Jones “goes too far” and thus fails to persuade); see also infra
Part III.A.1.c (asserting that Justice Stevens’s opinion in Illinois v. Caballes,
unnecessarily reworked earlier precedent).
20. David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original
Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 47 (2006).
21. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 758 (1994).
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contradictions and obscurities.”22 The Court has struggled to
resolve fundamental Fourth Amendment questions including
whether the Amendment contains a warrant presumption23 and
the proper breadth of searches incident to arrest.24 Even recently,
with the Court relying more and more consistently on the
“reasonableness” doctrine,25 the Court has drawn criticism for
favoring governmental interests over the privacy of individuals.26
John G. Roberts became the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court in 2005.27 Since that time, the Supreme Court has written
numerous Fourth Amendment opinions, with varying levels of
persuasive power.28 Of the Fourth Amendment decisions issued
between 2012 and 2015,29 seven have been deeply divided,
22. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1468, 1468 (1985). But see Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory
of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (offering a defense
and explanation for the seeming inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
23. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 471–73 (2008) (discussing the Court’s various interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause); THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 110–13 (2009) [hereinafter MCINNIS] (discussing the
Court’s creation of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement).
24. See Shoebotham, supra note 16, at 42 (discussing the debate surrounding
the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine).
25. Under this doctrine, the Court relies on the theory that “the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). To determine whether a search or seizure is
reasonable, the Court balances the intrusion the government commits against
certain governmental interests, including law enforcement purposes and public
safety. Id.
26. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1136 (2012) (noting that
the Court’s reasonableness doctrine “tend[s] to be overly deferential to the
government”); MCINNIS, supra note 23, at 282 (stating that the Court has
“enlarged the power of the government”).
27. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S. (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (noting the date Chief Justice John
Roberts assumed office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Infra Part III.
29. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015); City &
Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015); Rodriguez v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015);
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348
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demonstrating that the Justices were unable to convince even one
another.30 The Court’s majority opinion in cases like Maryland v.
King31 and Navarette v. California,32 include questionable logic.33
Even in a decision like United States v. Jones,34 where all the
Justices agreed on the proper outcome of the case, they disagreed
sharply about why.35 While this is not to say that disagreement
among the Justices is to be condemned, the lack of optimal
persuasiveness the disagreement evidences is to be avoided. When
a Supreme Court opinion fails to persuade, the legitimacy of the
decision is questioned.36 As stated above, because the Supreme
Court is not elected, the Court’s legitimacy comes primarily from
its power to persuade.37 Several of the Fourth Amendment
(2014); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct.
2012 (2014); Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Fernandez v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013);
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013); Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Bailey v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 1031 (2013); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012);
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469
(2012); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
30. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (split 5 to 4 decision);
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (split 6 to 3 decision);
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (split 5 to 4 decision); Maryland v.
King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (same); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)
(same); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (same); Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (same).
31. See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (authorizing the government to take
an individual’s DNA when arrested for a serious felony).
32. See 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–92 (2014) (permitting a weakly substantiated
anonymous tip to support a vehicle stop).
33. See infra Part III (discussing cases with questionable logic).
34. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
35. See id. at 953, 957 (noting the Court’s disagreement on which legal
standard should protect data collected from a GPS device).
36. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (“Unlike the
legislature or the executive, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either the sword
or the purse’ . . . so its authority depends in large measure on the public’s
willingness to respect and follow its decisions.”) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton)).
37. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’s
power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows
itself in people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s
law means and to declare what it demands.”); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99–101 (1959)
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opinions issued by Justices on the Roberts Court are simply
unpersuasive.38
The purpose of this Article is to examine the persuasiveness of
the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As part of
that examination, the Article will analyze various Fourth
Amendment opinions from the Court, including concurrences and
dissents. The opinions will be examined applying primarily
classical theories of rhetoric. The lens through which the opinions
will be evaluated is Aristotelian (focusing on different Justices’ use
of appeals to logic, emotion, and credibility). Upon evaluation of
the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions it becomes clear
that, more than the modality of constitutional analysis, the use of
effective rhetoric determines whether an opinion is a “good
opinion.” Although restricting this Article to examining only the
Fourth Amendment cases from 2005 forward is somewhat
arbitrary, it has a purpose. By limiting the discussion in this
fashion, the number of Fourth Amendment opinions is more
manageable and more current.
The Article is divided into three parts. Part II discusses
classical rhetorical theory and how it will be used to evaluate the
Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In this section
I hope to convince readers that persuasion is a universal ideal.
Although some of the measures of Aristotelian persuasion, like
logos (logical reasoning), may seem to favor a formalist approach
to constitutional theory, or like ethos (which includes the concept
of practical wisdom), might appear to favor a pragmatic approach,
Aristotle’s formula plays no favorites. I suggest that, regardless of
the theoretical starting point, a Justice’s opinion must incorporate
the core elements of effective rhetoric described by Aristotle and
others to be fully persuasive. Part III of the Article applies these
theories of rhetoric to several Fourth Amendment opinions issued
by the Justices of the Roberts Court. This section examines
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, focusing on opinions
(arguing that Supreme Court opinions can undermine the Court’s legitimacy
because they are often poorly written and have an insufficient basis in law);
Maltz, supra note 13, at 1397–400 (discussing arguments that well-crafted
opinions increase the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and maintain its “ability
to function effectively as a judicial institution”).
38. See supra note 33 (discussing Maryland v. King and Navarette v.
California).
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that demonstrate a weakness in a given area of evaluation. In Part
IV, I suggest several root causes for the weak persuasion described
in Part III.
First, weaknesses in ethos are connected to the doctrine of
stare decisis. In some decisions the weight of the doctrine seems to
paralyze the Justices. Fearing an unwise precedent, the Justice
opts for a decision that creates virtually no precedent at all. This
approach results in a lack of clear precedent and violates the
rhetorical principle of practical wisdom. Second, the constraining
effect of stare decisis causes some Justices to overstate or
understate precedent, claiming a case stands for a proposition that
it simply does not. This undermines the ethos of an opinion by
calling into question the author’s truthfulness or competence.
Weak appeals to pathos and logos manifest very differently in
opinions, but I suggest they often create the appearance that the
opinion is an inadequately veiled outcome-based judicial opinion.39
When a Justice has decided the outcome of an issue first and then
seeks to fashion a reason to support the position, weaknesses in
emotive- and logic-based arguments often occur. Such weaknesses
can appear in pathos-based arguments that seek to stir anger or
hate toward a criminal defendant instead of appealing to the
emotional touchstones of the Fourth Amendment, privacy and
security. Also, unveiled outcome-based judicial opinion writing
often results in strained or fallacious logic. Opinions that appear
outcome-directed are fundamentally less persuasive because they
fail to comply with the expectations of the Court’s audience.
II. Rhetoric: The Art and Science of Persuasion
The attempt to distill persuasive communication into a system
of analysis and application is thousands of years old.40 The search
39. It is important to note that this weakness is not intended as a negative
judgment of judicial realism. The debate over judicial realism has been raging for
decades and will no doubt continue for many more. This Article does not claim
that the doctrine of legal formalism is better than legal realism. Rather, this
Article asserts that the common expectation of the Court is that it is more
formalist that realist. Thus, opinions that appear to be decided first and
rationalized second are less persuasive.
40. See George A.Kennedy, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A
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for this system (at least in western civilization) reached a high
water mark between the fifth and third centuries B.C.E. in
Greece.41 During this time teachers and philosophers debated the
nature and purpose of rhetoric (persuasive communication).42 Out
of this era of debate and critical thinking came one of the most
important and comprehensive analyses of persuasive speech ever
written, Aristotle’s The Rhetoric.43 The Rhetoric captured and
organized the best of Greek teaching regarding persuasion,
coupled with Aristotle’s own insights.44
A. Classical Rhetorical Theory
Before beginning an in-depth discussion of Aristotle’s theories
on persuasion, it is valuable to briefly discuss the context in which
these theories developed. Aristotle was born into an era of western
civilization when rhetoric was the subject of intense debate and
analysis.45 In the fifth century B.C.E., democracy began to take
hold in Greece.46 As democracy grew so too did the need to
influence audiences with persuasive arguments.47 Athenian
THEORY OF CIVIL DISCOURSE 7 (George A. Kennedy trans., 2007) [hereinafter ON
RHETORIC] (“The earliest known rhetorical handbook is The Instructions of
Ptahhotep, composed by an Egyptian official sometime before 2000 B.C.E.”).
Kennedy, one of the leading scholars on Aristotle, actually uses different titles
when describing Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric, calling it ON RHETORIC and
RHETORIC interchangeably. Id. These alternative titles merely seem to reflect
differences in translation. For the purposes of this Article, I will use The Rhetoric
to refer to Aristotle’s writings on the subject.
41. See BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC 148–64 (1988) (discussing
the development of rhetoric against rival classical Greek traditions).
42. See generally JAMES HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN
INTRODUCTION 32–69 (2001). The term rhetoric is first used by Plato in Gorgias.
Id.
43. See id. at 87–88 (“[Aristotle’s] treatment of rhetoric remains one of the
most complete and insightful ever penned.”).
44. See id. at 78 (noting Aristotle’s three divisions of rhetoric).
45. See id. at 77–78 (discussing Aristotle’s dispute with the sophists over
rhetoric forms).
46. See id. at 32 (noting that Greek culture was shifting from an aristocracy
to a democracy).
47. See id. (“[T]he key factor in personal success and public influence was no
longer class but skill in persuasive speaking.”).
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democracy included direct representation, entitling all citizens to
vote.48 To be successful in this new style of government, persuasive
oral communication was necessary.49 Additionally, there were no
professional lawyers and enormous juries with hundreds of
members resolved legal disputes.50 Thus, if a Greek citizen wanted
to win a legal dispute, they often had to do it through their own
skills of persuasion.51
The importance of effective persuasion to Greek legal and
political life gave rise to a group of teachers called sophists.52 The
sophists generally were teachers from outside of the Greek citystate where they taught.53 Sophists taught persuasive speech for
money and some sophists claimed they could “persuade virtually
anyone of anything.”54 Several opened schools in different Greek
city-states to teach those who could pay.55 Several also wrote and
published books on the subject of persuasive speech.56
Suspicious of the sophists’ claims and hostile to their
philosophy, Plato wrote the dialogue, Gorgias.57 In that dialogue,
Plato asserted in effect that rhetoric was a tool of deception and
those who practiced it were seeking their own ends rather than the
48. See id. (noting that “the new system guaranteed a broader distribution
of power across different backgrounds, occupations, and economic statuses”).
49. See id. (noting that persuasive speaking was a key skill in Athenian
society).
50. See JAMES D. WILLIAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL RHETORIC:
ESSENTIAL READINGS 18 (2009) (“Athenian juries were large, ranging from several
hundred to several thousand members . . . .”).
51. See E. W. Timberlake, Jr., Origin and Development of Advocacy as a
Profession, 9 VA. L. REV. 25, 25 (1922) (“Among the ancient Greeks . . . . [t]he usual
custom was for the client to lay his case before one of the great orators or writers
of the day who would then prepare an oration which the client read or delivered
at the trial.”).
52. See Edward M. Cope, Introduction to ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC WITH
ANALYSIS NOTES AND APPENDICES 1–3 (1867) (discussing early developments of
rhetoric taught by the sophists).
53. See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 37 (explaining that Athenians were
skeptical of the sophists because they were foreigners).
54. Id. at 39.
55. See id. at 37 (noting Athenian skepticism of the sophists’ schools).
56. See id. at 42–45 (quoting from one prominent sophist’s writings).
57. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 84 (noting that Plato wrote Gorgias
attacking the sophists’ teaching of rhetoric).
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truth.58 Gorgias was published in approximately 387 B.C.E., when
Aristotle was three years old.59 Aristotle became Plato’s student
and initially was a critic of the sophists.60 As time passed, however,
his views on rhetoric diverged from Plato’s.61 Unlike Plato,
Aristotle saw rhetoric as a valuable tool in the search for truth.62
B. Aristotle’s The Rhetoric
In The Rhetoric, Aristotle sought to provide a comprehensive
analysis of persuasion.63 In doing so he defined rhetoric, described
the different types and species of persuasion, the primary methods
of persuasion present in all rhetoric, and the unique methods
within specific species of persuasion.64 In the Introduction to his
translation of The Rhetoric, George Kennedy, a scholar focusing on
classical rhetoric, explains that Aristotle’s writings on rhetoric
were never meant to be published.65 Rather, it is believed that
much of the book is a compilation of lectures he gave to students
in Athens.66 Further, Kennedy writes that The Rhetoric was not

58. See id. (“In the Gorgias, rhetoric is treated as subservient to politics.”).
59. See id. at 85 (explaining that the Gorgias was written around the time of
Plato’s visit to Sicily in 389–87 B.C.E.); HERRICK, supra note 42, at 72 (noting that
Aristotle was born in 384 B.C.E.).
60. See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 73 (noting that Aristotle, “under the
influence of Plato . . . was critical of rhetoric”)
61. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 161 (defending rhetoric on grounds that
it is misused by its speakers, rather than structurally flawed).
62. It could be argued that Plato did see a very limited specialized form of
rhetoric that could be used to find truth. In another dialogue called The Phaedrus,
Plato seems to imply that rhetoric can be a “true art” but to use it so would require
the rhetor to be a philosopher. HERRICK, supra note 42, at 63.
63. See VICKERS, supra note 41, at 19 (“[Aristotle] will describe ‘the
systematic principles of Rhetoric itself,’ and defines it as ‘the faculty of observing
in any given case the available means of persuasion.’”)
64. See id. at 18–26 (presenting a comprehensive description of the forms of
rhetoric).
65. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 17–18 (explaining that The Rhetoric
was not published until three-hundred years after Aristotle’s death).
66. See id. at 18 (noting that Aristotle’s students were the intended audience
of The Rhetoric).
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the product of one or two years of study and writing, but was the
product of decades of thinking, writing, and revising.67
The Rhetoric begins with Aristotle’s explanation of what
rhetoric is and why the study of rhetoric is important.68 He
described rhetoric as “an ability, in each case, to see the available
means of persuasion.”69 He explained that “persuasion occurs
through the arguments when we show the truth or the apparent
truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”70 Although aware
that rhetoric could be used to mislead,71 Aristotle nonetheless
believed it was useful.72 He explained the primary value of
studying rhetoric is to reach the truth and to convince others of the
truth.73 Students of effective rhetoric should be able to argue both
sides of an issue “in order that it may not escape [their] notice what
the real state of the case is and that [they themselves] may be able
to refute if another person uses speech unjustly.”74 Thus, “rhetoric
is useful because the true and the just are by nature stronger than
their opposites.”75
After describing rhetoric, Aristotle divided the types of
persuasive speech into three genres or species that are separated
contextually and temporally.76 The first is deliberative speech.77 It
is directed toward future events being resolved through the
67. See id. (discussing the various decades in which Aristotle developed The
Rhetoric).
68. See id. at 30–37 (discussing Aristotle’s dissatisfaction with rhetorical
practice and teaching).
69. Id. at 37.
70. Id. at 39.
71. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 31–32 (“[F]or it is wrong to warp the
jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone
made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it.”).
72. See id. at 35 (“[R]hetoric is useful, because the true and the just are by
nature stronger than their opposites . . . .”).
73. See id. at 34 (“[I]t belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and
what resembles the true . . . .”).
74. Id. at 35.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 46–50 (noting that for each species of rhetoric, there is a class
to which the audience of the speeches belongs).
77. See id. at 48 (stating that deliberative advice is either exhortative or
dissuasive).
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political process.78 The second is judicial speech, which is
sometimes called forensic speech.79 It is directed toward past
events being resolved in a court of law.80 The final species is
epideictic speech, which is concerned with evoking praise or
condemnation in the context of a public address and is focused on
producing a response in the present.81 Although each species of
persuasion shares some common methods, The Rhetoric discussed
the ways in which persuasion differs depending on the species.82
Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into three species highlights one
of the many challenges that Justices face when writing a Fourth
Amendment opinion. The purpose of dividing rhetoric into three
species is to optimize a rhetor’s persuasiveness by narrowing the
objective of the rhetoric.83 Most Fourth Amendment opinions,
however, will require a Justice to be persuasive in all three types
of rhetoric. To be maximally persuasive, a Justice must convince
her audience that she has been fair and just to the litigants in the
case, established a wise and correct rule for the future, and
properly praised or condemned the virtues and vices present in the
case.84
Next, Aristotle identified the three primary components of
persuasion.85 This system has sometimes been described as a
triangle to emphasize the unitary nature of Aristotle’s theory of

78. See id. (identifying future events to dissuade or exhort the audience).
79. See id. at 47 (urging against the term “forensic” speech, Kennedy denotes
the confusion associated with the term).
80. See id. at 48 (prosecuting or defending concerns events of the past).
81. See id. at 47 (noting that in Aristotle’s time, epideictic speech was usually
used at a funeral oration or a commemorative event).
82. See id. (stating that there are three species of rhetoric due to the three
classes to which hearers of speeches belong).
83. See id. (stating that the objective of the speech should relate to the
audience).
84. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 733, 746–47 (2004) (arguing that judicial opinions must persuade
other judges to join the opinion and later apply the opinion to other cases, and
the parties to the case, who must feel they have been treated fairly and received
due process).
85. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 111 (providing these components
initially in Book I and further explaining them in Book II).
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argumentation.86 Each of the three components of persuasion
impacts the other, thus the theory is described as having three
sides rather than three pillars.87 These components are ethos,
logos, and pathos.88
Ethos is “the character of the speaker”89 or said another way,
“presenting the character of the speaker in a favorable light.”90
Important to this component is that the audience’s belief in the
character of the speaker “should result from the speech, not from
a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person.”91
Aristotle rejected the sophist belief that ethos was of little
significance.92 He asserted “character is almost . . . the most
authoritative form of persuasion.”93 The Rhetoric breaks ethos
down further to include both “practical wisdom . . . [and] virtue.”94
Thus, strong ethos appeals convince an audience that the
presenter has good practical sense and so his or her position is the
correct one and the presenter is competent and virtuous, and so
can be trusted.95
Within this Article, the ethos analysis will follow Aristotle’s
suggestion closely. The first measure of analysis is the opinion’s
virtue, or the competence and truthfulness of its author. This point
of evaluation does not allege that any of the Supreme Court
Justices have a bad character, but rather examines how various
opinions deal with favorable and unfavorable precedent. The
question is whether the author’s suggested account of prior Court
86. See, e.g., Aristotle’s Rhetorical Triangle, BLACK HILLS STATE UNIV.,
(2015), https://www.bhsu.edu/Portals/32/Rhetorical%20Appeals.pdf (depicting a
triangle containing the three components of persuasion).
87. See Scharffs, supra note 84, at 756 (“Aristotle stressed that all three
elements are essential and inexorably linked to successful persuasion.”).
88. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 38–39 (listing and characterizing
each component).
89. Id. at 38.
90. Id. at 111.
91. Id. at 39.
92. See id. at 39 (disputing the notion that ethos did not contribute to
persuasiveness).
93. Id.
94. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 112.
95. See id. at 112–13 (stating that without practical sense the speaker will
not form opinions correctly).
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rulings hold together with the current ruling, or are we left to
question whether the author of the opinion is correct or truly
believes what he or she had written. Next, I will examine the
practicality of the case opinion and the rule the opinion proposes.
This point of evaluation will examine how clear and
understandable the proposed rule is, and whether such a rule lends
itself to application in real-world law enforcement.
The next component of analysis is pathos. Aristotle explained
that an audience can be persuaded “when they are led to feel
emotion by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when
grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile.”96
Aristotle devoted a fair amount of The Rhetoric to how emotion can
be used as part of persuasion.97
Although some might reject the idea that judges should
incorporate appeals to emotion in their opinions, decisions
involving the Fourth Amendment are often already emotionally
charged.98 Failing to acknowledge the strong emotions stirred by
Fourth Amendment decisions would be a mistake.99 In order for
Justices to provide adequately persuasive opinions, they must
either make allowances for these emotions or capitalize on them.
The final method of persuasion Aristotle described is logos.100
The Greek word logos literally means “what is said,” but in The
96. Id.
97. See id. at 38–39 (varying the discussion between emotions that the
speaker wishes to elicit from the audience about herself, which is more in line
with the concept of ethos, and those the speaker directs at a contrary opinion).
In this section of the Article, pathos will be used to discuss emotions that the
author seeks to elicit about an issue or individual involved in the case that is
the subject of the judicial opinion.
98. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core
interests essential to human flourishing; interests in privacy, property, and
freedom of movement.”).
99. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
125, 129 (2002) (“To be sure, sometimes the Court’s cases unavoidably address
the relevance of emotions involved in governmental searches, but this is done all
too rarely, and when emotions are mentioned, the ones identified are usually
rendered minimally important to the Court’s conclusions.”).
100. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 111 (identifying logos as the third
component).
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Rhetoric it seems clear that logos is the reason or logic that shows,
or appears to show, something to be true.101 In this regard Aristotle
explained that “there is on the one hand induction and on the other
the syllogism and apparent syllogism.”102 Although the term
syllogism has come to be associated with formal logic, Aristotle did
not mean it to have so narrow a meaning.103 In The Rhetoric, he
accepted that few premises that form the basis of syllogisms are
necessarily true.104
In this section of the Article, the logos analysis will evaluate
the logic of various opinions. As part of this examination, the
opinions will be distilled into syllogistic form and evaluated to
determine whether the syllogism is sound on its face and then
whether the foundation of the syllogism is strong or weak.
III. Ethos, Pathos, and Logos as Applied
As mentioned above, because of the interdependence of ethos,
pathos, and logos, Aristotle’s formula is often described as a
triangle.105 This metaphor is apt. If one, two, or all three sides of a
triangle are out of proportion with one another, the shape’s
stability is significantly lessened; so too with persuasion. The
following section examines several Fourth Amendment opinions
from Justices on the Roberts Court. These opinions have been
selected because they illustrate weakness in the use of the
individual components of persuasion.
A. Ethos: The Foundation
Aristotle’s vision of ethos is well summarized in the following
passage: “[There is persuasion] through character whenever the
101. See id. at 39 (“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we
show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”).
102. Id. at 40.
103. See id. (stating that it is always necessary to show something either by
syllogizing or by inducing).
104. Id. at 40.
105. Supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of
credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and
more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects.”106 As mentioned
above, this section will discuss how ethos is affected through
Justices’ use of precedent and their crafting of rules for real-world
application.
1. Credibility and Stare Decisis
At points in The Rhetoric, Aristotle uses the terms ethos and
character interchangeably and he treats both as synonymous with
credibility.107 His point, which seems well made, is that an
audience must first believe the advocate is correct and being
truthful before they can believe the truth and accuracy of the
advocate’s position.108 Thus, credibility has two components:
competence and honesty.109 In the context of this discussion
competence is demonstrated when the Justice’s opinion is
comprehensive, showing that the Justice understands the relevant
precedent impacting the case. Honesty means the judge is being
truthful in his or her accounting of the law.
Evaluating the credibility of a Justice’s opinion is a difficult
matter. First, competence and honesty are not black and white
determinations. Rather, both concepts move along a scale of more
or less competent or honest. Further, it can be challenging to parse
out what is an incredible opinion as opposed to an opinion with
which a reader simply disagrees. Finally, it is important to note
that what is being discussed in this Article is apparent competence
and honesty. The Article does not assert that a particular Justice
106. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 38.
107. See id. at 38–39 (claiming character is one of the most authoritative
forms of persuasion).
108. But see Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court
Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1015–16 (2007) (arguing that Supreme
Court opinions need not utilize valid arguments for the outcome to be in step
with public expectations).
109. Cf. James C. McCroskey, Scales for the Measurement of Ethos, JAMES C.
MCCROSKEY, http://www.jamescmccroskey.com/publications/22.htm (last
updated Nov. 5, 2003) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (identifying common
components in the division of ethos comparable to the components suggested
above) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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is, in fact, incompetent or dishonest. Rather, the Article asserts
that certain common deficiencies in opinion writing results in
opinions that appear less competent or less truthful.
Below are three examples of opinions where I suggest Justices
have offered opinions that suffer from weak credibility. In some
opinions, the Justice has failed to fully account for language in
earlier precedent that is contrary to their position. This failure can
leave a reader wondering if the Justice either missed the contrary
point or simply did not have a good answer and so chose not to
address it. In two of the opinions below, the Justices appear to
present a position that is different from an earlier opinion they
wrote. Of course, a Justice may change his or her mind. In these
opinions, however, the change in position is unexplained. Such a
shift in position without an explanation can leave a reader with
the sense of an untrustworthy position.
a. Rodriguez v. United States
The first opinion is Justice Thomas’s dissent in Rodriguez v.
United States.110 The Rodriguez case was decided in 2015 and
focused on the Court’s interpretation of Illinois v. Caballes.111
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, claimed that the Court
was “adher[ing] to the line drawn in [Caballes].”112 Justice Thomas
in dissent claimed that the majority’s opinion could not “be
reconciled with our decision in Caballes.”113
In Rodriguez, a police officer pulled the defendant over for a
traffic violation.114 The officer conducted all the business necessary
to the traffic stop, issued Rodriquez a ticket, and then asked for
permission to conduct a dog-sniff of Rodriquez’s vehicle.115
110. 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617–24 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. 543 U.S. 405 (2005). Caballes was the Court’s 2005 decision where it held
that a warrantless and suspicionless dog sniff of an automobile stopped for a
traffic violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
112. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612.
113. Id. at 1617 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 1612 (stating that the police officer pulled the defendant over
for violating a Nebraska law which prohibited driving on a highway shoulder).
115. See id. at 1613 (“Although justification for the traffic stop was ‘out of the
way,’ Struble asked for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle.”).
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Rodriguez refused.116 The officer next ordered Rodriguez to shut off
his car and exit the vehicle.117 Approximately five minutes later
another deputy arrived at the scene, and three minutes later the
drug detection dog alerted.118 A search of the vehicle revealed a
quantity of methamphetamine.119
Before a Magistrate Judge, Rodriguez challenged the dog sniff
as illegal because the officer prolonged the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion.120 The Magistrate Judge found that there
was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to have prolonged the
traffic stop once the citation was issued.121 He found, however, that
the seven to eight minute additional detention amounted to a de
minimis intrusion on Mr. Rodriguez’s rights and was thus
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.122 The District Court
adopted the Magistrate’s findings of fact and law, and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.123 A majority of the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case.124
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority and was joined by
Justices Alito and Kennedy.125 In his dissent, Justice Thomas
116. Id.
117. See id. (“Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition, exit
the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol car to wait for the second officer.
Rodriguez complied.”).
118. See id. at 1612 (“The dog alerted to the presence of drugs halfway
through Struble’s second pass. All told, seven or eight minutes had elapsed from
the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog indicated the presence
of drugs.”).
119. See id. (“A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of
methamphetamine.”).
120. See id. (“He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the
ground, among others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.”).
121. See id. (“The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause to search the
vehicle independent of the dog alert.”).
122. Id. at 1613.
123. See id. at 1613–14 (“The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, ‘dog
sniffs that occur within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are
not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions.’”
(quoting United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006))).
124. See id. at 1617 (remanding to the Eighth Circuit to determine whether
reasonable suspicion warranted expanding the time required for the drug stop).
125. Id.
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repeatedly asserted that the majority’s opinion was contrary to
Caballes.126 As part of that claim Justice Thomas stated, “[a]s
Caballes makes clear, the fact that Officer Struble waited until
after he gave Rodriguez the warning to conduct the dog sniff does
not alter this analysis.”127 He also declared, “Caballes expressly
anticipated that a traffic stop could be reasonably prolonged for
officers to engage in a dog sniff.”128
Justice Thomas’s statements regarding the Caballes decision
are forceful and definitive, but the opinion does not support them.
There are at least three errors in Justice Thomas’s
characterization of Caballes. First, the Caballes Court was not
required to resolve whether a traffic stop could be extended for the
purpose of conducting a dog sniff.129 Second, the dicta of Caballes
strongly supports a conclusion contrary to Justice Thomas’s
position.130 Third, the Caballes Court offered an example of what
would constitute an improper detention that strongly resembles
the facts in Rodriguez.131 Each of these errors has the effect of
weakening Justice Thomas’s opinion by suggesting a less than
fully competent accounting of the Caballes case.
The first problem with Justice Thomas’s claims regarding the
controlling power of the Caballes decision is that Caballes did not
reach the same issue as the Rodriquez decision. The question
presented in Caballes was “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment
requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug126. See id. at 1617–19, 1622 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding
to the contrary cannot be reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of
common police practices.”).
127. Id. at 1618.
128. Id. at 1619.
129. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“The question on which
we granted certiorari is narrow: ‘Whether the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a
vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.’” (citing Pet. for Cert. i.)).
130. See id. (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission.”).
131. See id. at 407–08 (“In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred
during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of contraband were the product
of an unconstitutional seizure.”).
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detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.”132
The majority in Caballes answered no.133 The essence of the
majority opinion was that dog sniffs do not infringe on any
legitimate privacy interest, so using a canine sniff during an
otherwise lawful traffic stop raises no additional Fourth
Amendment issue.134 An important part of the Caballes case was
that the officer who stopped the defendant had not completed the
traffic related components of the stop before the canine unit
conducted its sweep of the vehicle.135 Given that the Caballes Court
did not have to resolve the issue in Rodriguez,136 Justice Thomas’s
claim that the majority opinion in Rodriguez was contrary to
Caballes is an unsupported stretch.
Second, although the Caballes Court never specifically
reached the question raised in Rodriguez, the majority gave strong
indications that if it had, its conclusion would have been contrary
to Justice Thomas’s Rodriguez dissent. The majority in Caballes
observed that the initial stop of Caballes was lawful but, “a seizure
that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if
its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected
by the Constitution.”137 The Court went on to explain that “[a]
seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning
ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond
the time reasonably required to complete that mission.”138 This
132. Id. at 407.
133. See id. at 409 (“Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous
alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case,
the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish
probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk.”).
134. See id. at 408 (finding that conduct merely revealing the possession of
contraband does not compromise a legitimate privacy interest).
135. See id. at 406 (“While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning
ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent’s car.”).
136. Compare id. at 407 (stating that the issue was whether the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a
drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop), with
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (stating that the issue
was whether police routinely may extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop,
absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff).
137. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
138. Id.
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statement, although arguably dicta is, nonetheless, fairly explicit
dicta.
Justice Thomas tried to diffuse this language by claiming that:
The dividing line [in Caballes] was whether the overall duration
of the stop exceeded “the time reasonably required to complete
th[e] mission,” not, as the majority suggests, whether the
duration of the stop “in fact” exceeded the time necessary to
complete the traffic-related inquiries.139

There are at least two problems with Justice Thomas’s
attempt to explain away this language. First, Justice Thomas
placed emphasis on the Caballes Court’s decision to use the word
“mission,” implying there is a difference between an officer’s
“mission” when conducting a traffic stop and the officer’s “traffic
related inquiries.”140 The context with which the Caballes Court
used the term mission, however, does not support this
construction. The Caballes Court explicitly links the word mission
to the steps necessary to issuing a driver a ticket.141 Second, Justice
Thomas suggested that the majority meant to draw a distinction
between the time it actually takes to conduct a traffic stop and the
time it reasonably should take to conduct a traffic stop.142 This
distinction suggests that if the time it actually takes to complete a
traffic stop is less than what might be viewed as reasonable, the
officer can bank the saved time. Under this theory, if a police officer
completed a traffic stop and issued a ticket in seven minutes, but
the stop could have reasonably taken thirty minutes, the officer
can detain the motorist for an additional twenty-three minutes of
questioning. The Rodriguez majority commented on this idea,

139. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1619 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 1616 (“If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries
expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete
[the stop’s] mission.’” (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005))).
141. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is
justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that
mission.” (emphasis added)).
142. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1619–20 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “dividing line” is what is reasonably
required “not, as the majority suggests, whether the duration of the stop ‘in fact’
exceeded the time necessary”).
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suggesting that Justice Thomas believes police “can earn bonus
time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.”143
Justice
Thomas
attempted
to
use
this
actual-versus-reasonable distinction to claim the majority in
Caballes, “expressly anticipated that a traffic stop could be
reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff.”144 This
statement has no support in the Caballes decision. Moreover, it is
contrary to one of the examples the majority in Caballes provided.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Caballes,
explained:
In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an
unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of
contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure.
People v. Cox, 202 Ill.2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002). We may
assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if
the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being
unlawfully detained.145

Thus, had Caballes been factually the same as Cox, then the dog
sniff in Caballes would have been illegal. In Cox, the officer
conducted a lawful traffic stop because the defendant’s rear
registration light was out.146 Immediately after stopping the
defendant, the officer called for a canine unit.147 The dog arrived
approximately fifteen minutes after the initial stop and before the
officer had issued a ticket.148 In Cox, the Illinois Supreme Court
found fifteen minutes was too long of a detention for the traffic
143. Id. at 1616 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 1619 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407–08.
146. See People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ill. 2002) (“On July 18, 1998, at
approximately 2:21 a.m., Officer Matt McCormick of the Fairfield police
department stopped defendant’s vehicle because it did not have a rear
registration light.”), overruled by People v. Brew, 866 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. 2008)
(“After the Caballes decisions, it is clear that a suspicionless dog sniff at a routine
traffic stop is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . While the specific and
articulable facts prong of Cox is overruled, the duration prong still survives.”).
147. See Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 277 (“At the time of the stop, Officer McCormick
called Deputy Dave Zola and asked him to bring his canine, Tango, to the scene.”).
148. See id. (arriving at the scene fifteen minutes after the call, Deputy Zola
walked the dog around the defendant’s vehicle).
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stop, and implied the officer stalled during the traffic stop in order
for the canine unit to arrive.149 It is also noteworthy that in
Caballes, from the start of the traffic stop to when the dog alerted
to the presence of drugs, a total of ten minutes had passed.150 In
Rodriguez, it took the officer twenty-one to twenty-two minutes to
issue a ticket, five more minutes for the canine unit to arrive, and
another two to three minutes before the dog alerted to the presence
of drugs.151
The Caballes case does not support Justice Thomas’s strong
and definitive statements. In fact, Caballes is much more
supportive of the majority’s position in Rodriguez than Justice
Thomas’s. Additionally, claiming support from Caballes was
unnecessary, as Justice Thomas’s arguments against the majority
opinion did not require Caballes for resolution of the issue. The
essence of Justice Thomas’s dissent was that the majority had
strayed from the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone of
reasonableness, and in doing so unnecessarily tied law
enforcement’s hands during traffic stops.152 These claims could be
valid whether or not he cited to Caballes. Further, Justice
Thomas’s arguably strongest point in the dissent—that the
majority has missed the distinction between a traffic stop based on
reasonable suspicion and one based on probable cause153—did not
rely on Caballes for its validity. The valuable points in Justice
Thomas’s dissent are lost in his claims about Caballes.

149. See id. at 280 (“We have examined the record and find that it is devoid
of circumstances which would justify the length of the detention. Rather, the
record leads us to conclude this was a routine traffic stop, which should have
resulted in a correspondingly abbreviated detention.”).
150. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005) (“The entire incident
lasted less than 10 minutes.”).
151. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
152. See id. at 1617 (“The only question here is whether an officer executed a
stop in a reasonable manner . . . . Because the stop was reasonably executed, no
Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”).
153. See id. at 1620 (“On a more fundamental level, the majority’s inquiry
elides the distinction between traffic stops based on probable cause and those
based on reasonable suspicion.”).
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b. United States v. Jones
The next Fourth Amendment case from the Roberts Court
discussed under the heading of ethos is Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in United States v. Jones.154 Jones is one of the most
significant Fourth Amendment decisions to come down from the
Robert’s Court.155 In Jones, a majority of the Justices revised the
test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies in a
given situation.156 Before Jones, the Court applied the reasonable
expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States.157 The Katz
test asks two questions to determine whether a Fourth
Amendment interest is at stake: (1) did the defendant have an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) was it an
expectation society is willing to recognize as legitimate.158 After
Jones, the Court asks whether the Government has engaged in a
warrantless physical trespass for the purpose of obtaining
information and, if the answer is no, then the Court applies the
Katz test.159
In addition to being a transformative Fourth Amendment
case, Jones is the culmination of Justice Scalia’s decades-long
effort to close potential privacy gaps created when the Court
adopted the Katz test.160 Although Justice Scalia achieved his
154. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
155. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, United States v. Jones and the Future of
Privacy Law: The Potential Far-Reaching Implications of the GPS Surveillance
Case, BNA (Feb. 8, 2012), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/files/BNAJones-FINAL.pdf (discussing Jones and noting that it is “a profound decision in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as well as in privacy law more generally”).
156. See id. (“Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia bases the
Fourth Amendment analysis on a property rationale that had not been used much
after the reasonable expectation of privacy test became the approach to
determining whether there was a Fourth Amendment search.”).
157. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that, for example, a
person’s home has an expectation of privacy, but an open area does not because
society would be unwilling to recognize it as reasonable).
159. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (“But we need not address the Government's
contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation.”).
160. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text,
Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175,
232 (2015) (“Jones is the culmination of Justice Scalia’s twenty-six-year long fight
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objective, it was by a narrow margin. In Jones, all the Justices
agreed on the outcome of the decision, but only four joined Justice
Scalia’s opinion.161 Central to the disagreement was what role, if
any, a trespass analysis should play in the Court’s opinion. Four
Justices believed a trespass/property-based test was unnecessary
and inappropriate to a modern analysis of the Fourth
Amendment.162 Justice Scalia explained his approach by asserting
that the Katz test did not replace the trespass doctrine, but merely
supplemented it.163 It is this assertion that is the subject of the
discussion below.
The facts in Jones are fairly simple. Police suspected Jones of
being involved in drug trafficking.164 As part of their investigation,
they obtained a warrant authorizing them to place an electronic
global positioning satellite tracking device on Jones’s vehicle.165
The warrant had a time and location limitation.166 Police violated
the warrant’s limitations and subsequently tracked the movement
of Jones’s vehicle for over twenty days.167 The information derived
from the GPS, along with other evidence, was used to convict Jones
of possession and trafficking in illegal narcotics.168 Jones brought
to alter the Court’s test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment interest is
present in a given case.”).
161. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401 (2012).
162. See id. at 401, 418–19 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that utilizing
outdated tort law concepts is “unwise”).
163. See id. at 409 (majority opinion) (“But as we have discussed, the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”).
164. See id. at 402 (“Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District
of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made the
target of an investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task
force.”).
165. Id. at 402–03.
166. See id. (explaining that the warrant authorized installation of the GPS
device in the District of Columbia within ten days).
167. See id. at 403 (describing how the agents violated the warrant by
installing a GPS tracking device “[o]n the 11th day, and not in the District of
Columbia but in Maryland” and then followed the movement of Jones’s vehicle
“[o]ver the next 28 days”).
168. See id. at 403–04 (“The Government introduced at trial . . . GPS-derived
locational data . . . which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ stash
house . . . . The jury returned a guilty verdict.”).
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a motion to suppress all evidence secured through and because of
the government’s use of the GPS device.169 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether the placement and subsequent use of
the GPS device to track Jones’s movements were a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.170 The Court ruled these actions were.171
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the
government’s physical intrusion on the defendant’s property.172 He
stated, “It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case:
The Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information.”173 He went on to say that “[w]e
have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.”174 Based on these facts, and the
absence of a warrant, Justice Scalia found the Fourth Amendment
had been violated.175 In responding to the government’s argument
that the Katz test had not been violated, Justice Scalia wrote,
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation.”176 He then went on to claim that “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”177 Much of
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is spent defending this claim.
169. See id. at 403 (“Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained
through the GPS device. The District Court granted the motion only in part,
suppressing the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage
adjoining Jones’s residence . . . . It held the remaining data admissible.”).
170. See id. at 402 (“[D]ecid[ing] whether the attachment of a
Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
171. See id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
172. See id. at 404–05 (explaining that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’” and that the
Government physically occupied Jones’s vehicle to obtain information).
173. Id. at 404.
174. Id. at 404–05.
175. See id. at 404, 412 (finding that the admission of evidence obtained by
warrantless physical intrusion was “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy”).
176. Id. at 400.
177. Id. at 409.
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Justice Scalia’s assertion is bold. He claims, in effect, that the
trespass test has been alive for the last fifty years and the Court
simply has not expressly discussed or applied it.178 To support his
position, he relies primarily on the traditional connection between
the Fourth Amendment and property, portions of the Katz
decision, and two post-Katz decisions.179 Although Justice Scalia’s
argument is not without support, it simply goes too far, leaving
readers to question whether Justice Scalia really believes his own
argument.
At least three pieces of substantial evidence stand against
Justice Scalia’s assertion. First, the Katz opinion strongly signaled
the Court’s decision to drop the trespass test from the status of a
primary test to, at most, a subordinate sub-test.180 Second, the
weight of time and subsequent decisions argue against Justice
Scalia. In the last forty-five years, the United States Supreme
Court has never relied on “the trespass test or doctrine” to resolve
a Fourth Amendment issue.181 To be sure, the cases from the last
fifty years establish that there is a relationship between property
and the Fourth Amendment.182 They however, do not establish
that the Court has been merely biding its time, waiting for the
right case to fully reassert the trespass doctrine. Finally, Justice
178. See id. at 407 (“Katz did not erode the principle ‘that, when the
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area
in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286
(1983))).
179. Id. at 407–08.
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that
the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling.”).
181. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“Our later cases
have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said
that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360)).
182. See id. at 405 (describing the evolution of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and its close connection to property (citing Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))); see also id. at 407 (“Katz, the Court explained, established
that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,’
but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously recognized protection for property.’” (citing
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992))).
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Scalia’s own opinions have asserted conclusions contrary to the
claim that the trespass test has merely been lying dormant.183
Katz v. United States was the Jones decision of its day.184 In
Katz, the Court brought to a close a chapter in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that began with Justice Brandeis’s dissent in
Olmstead v. United States.185 In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft,
writing for a majority of the Court, created the trespass doctrine.186
183. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also cases cited infra note
212 (citing Justice Scalia).
184. See Tom McInnis, The Changing Definition of Search or Seizure, 11.2
A.B.A. INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 12 (2011) (“Katz’s change in approach had the
potential to enlarge the protections of the Fourth Amendment beyond those
things specifically mentioned or directly implied in the amendment to include a
wide variety of other human activities.”).
185. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead advocated
that the Court apply a Fourth Amendment interpretation that was not limited to
the trespass theory. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). He noted that
wire-tapping, whether through trespass or not, worked “[a]s a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of
tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping.” Id. at 476.
186. See id. at 466 (majority opinion). Chief Justice Taft writes that no
violation of the Fourth Amendment can be found “unless there has been an official
search and seizure of [the defendant], or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’
for the purpose of making a seizure.” Id. It is noteworthy that other Justices and
scholars have asserted that the Olmstead decision did not rest on the trespass
doctrine, but rather on the broad statement that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the spoken word. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 n.*
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision must be recognized as
overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, which essentially rested on
the ground that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.”); see also id. at 369 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[M]y reading of the
Olmstead and Goldman cases convinces me that they were decided on the basis
of the inapplicability of the wording of the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping,
and not on any trespass basis.”). But see id. at 353 (majority opinion) (“It is true
that the absence of [physical] penetration was at one time thought to foreclose
further Fourth Amendment inquiry.”); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 633
(1991) (discussing how Olmstead relied on trespass (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353–
54)); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Olmstead and Katz to note the trespass doctrine was overruled); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) (noting that Olmstead was decided on
trespass); William S. Doenges, Search and Seizure: The Physical Trespass
Doctrine and the Adaption of the Fourth Amendment to Modern Technology, 2
TULSA L.J. 180, 181 (1965) (discussing how Olmstead placed emphasis on the lack
of “physical trespass” and found that “[i]n essence, a physical entry into the
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In that same decision Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent where he
argued, in effect, that physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area was immaterial to whether a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred.187 Justice Brandeis’s position ultimately won
out.188 In Katz, the Court changed its test for determining whether
a Fourth Amendment interest existed from the Olmstead trespass
doctrine to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.189
Under the old rule, a physical trespass into a constitutionally
protected area was necessary in order for the Fourth Amendment
to be violated.190 Under the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test, a physical trespass was no longer necessary to
conclude the Fourth Amendment was violated.191 Of course, this
does not resolve the question in Jones.
The fact that a trespass is no longer necessary to determine
that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is not the same
as saying that when a trespass has occurred, it is not necessarily a
Fourth Amendment violation. The simple fact is that the Katz
decision never truly resolved this issue.192 The focus of the majority
victim’s premises was necessary before he could complain that his rights were
violated”).
187. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Applying to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments the established rule of
construction . . . . It is, of course, immaterial where the physical
connection . . . into the defendants’ premises was made.”).
188. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of the Fourth Amendment
cannot turn upon . . . a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”).
189. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule
that has emerged . . . is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
190. See id. at 349 (majority opinion) (explaining that prior to this case the
rule for determining violations of the Fourth Amendment was based on “physical
entrance” (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928))).
191. See id. at 353 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects both
people and areas against unreasonable searches and seizures regardless of a
trespass).
192. See id. at 350 (“[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected
area’ . . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
406–07 (2012) (discussing how Katz “did not repudiate [the] understanding” that
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opinion and Justice Harlan’s concurrence was on expanding the
limits of the Fourth Amendment’s reach, not on limiting it.193 That
much favors Justice Scalia’s position.194 The opinions of the
majority and Justice Harlan, however, strongly suggest that the
Court intended the trespass doctrine to be, at most, a component
of the new “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.195
The majority opinion in Katz, written by Justice Stewart,
appears to remove property from the Fourth Amendment
equation.196 Justice Stewart noted that “the premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited.”197 He also noted that “whether or not a given
the Fourth Amendment was concerned about government intrusion, it simply
established a different test without deciding how trespass fit into the test).
193. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to
do with privacy at all”); id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurrence) (describing how
previous precedent was a “limitation on Fourth Amendment protection” that is
“bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be
defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion”).
194. See Jones, 500 U.S. at 405–06 (explaining how Katz expanded the Fourth
Amendment).
195. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“Thus, although a closely divided Court
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the
seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have
since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested.”); id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.” The question, however, is what protection it affords to
those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires
reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as “reasonable.” Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances
would be unreasonable.
196. See id. at 347–60 (analyzing what is protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
197. Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
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‘area,’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects
attention from the problem presented in this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people not places.”198 Justice Stewart goes on
to state, “[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”199
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, from which the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test derives, includes property as one of the
considerations in determining whether the two-part Katz test has
been satisfied.200 He explained:
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.” The question, however, is what protection it
affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that
question requires reference to a “place.” My understanding of
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement.201

Justice Harlan then went on to describe the two-part
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.202 Justice Harlan noted
that the old test’s “limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is,
in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as
physical invasion.”203
It appears that the two relevant Katz opinions do not support
Justice Scalia’s formulation in Jones. The Katz majority was
unclear on how they thought property or trespass should play in
their new formulation.204 Justice Harlan is clearer and perhaps
that is why his formulation gained primacy. That clarity, however,
304 (1967)).
198. Id. at 351.
199. Id. at 353.
200. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the two-part
requirement).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 362.
204. See id. at 353 (majority opinion) (explaining that the trespass doctrine is
no longer the controlling test for Fourth Amendment violations).
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squarely places property and trespass under the Katz test and not
alongside it, or—according to Justice Scalia’s design—before it.205
Justice Scalia also cites two post-Katz majority opinions and a
concurring opinion to assert that the trespass doctrine was meant
to endure independent of the Katz test.206 Although the cases
support the general argument that the Katz test was not meant to
roll back Fourth Amendment protection, they only partially
support the more controversial claim that the trespass test has
endured all these many years.207 Despite the support Justice Scalia
205. Compare id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test applies to “people, not places. The question,
however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the
answer to that question requires reference to a place”), with United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (“[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that
the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the
home [or property].” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 189
(1969))).
206. Justice Scalia cites the majority opinions in Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992), and Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 407.
207. Of these two cases, Alderman is more supportive of Justice Scalia’s claim.
Alderman resolves the unique question of whether a defendant had standing to
challenge the government’s use of evidence secured through a warrantless
listening device in a defendant’s home when the evidence did not include the
defendant’s conversations. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). A
majority of the Court ruled no. Id. at 171–76. Justice White, writing for the
majority, stated:
Because the Court has now decided that the Fourth Amendment
protects a person’s private conversations as well as his private
premises . . . [citing to Katz], the dissent would discard the concept
that private conversations overheard through an illegal entry into a
private place must be excluded as the fruits of a Fourth Amendment
violation.
Id. at 178. He goes on to state:
Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to
withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the
home or to overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since
Silverman, that conversations as well as property are excludable from
the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal
invasion of the home
Id. at 180. Justice Harlan dissented in part, arguing that “conversational privacy
is a personal right, not a property right.” Id. at 194 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
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cites, two majority opinions and one concurr208ence seem a paltry
quantum of evidence when compared to numerous opinions that
have cited and used the Katz test.208 For example, cases like United
States v. Jacobsen,209 where the Court approved of law
enforcement’s warrantless penetration of a defendant’s property to
test its contents for drugs, would seem clearly in error.210
Additionally, the case most commonly associated with the trespass
test, Olmstead, is simply never cited except to note that the Katz
decision overruled it.211
Finally, Justice Scalia’s own words in two prior decisions
undercut his assertions regarding the trespass doctrine.212 In
and dissenting in part). Thus, according to Justice Harlan, the defendant did not
have standing to object to a violation of other people’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Id.
208. A Westlaw search revealed that Katz has been cited in 150 Supreme
Court opinions. Search results for “389 U.S. 347,” WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com
(sign in; then enter “389 U.S. 347” in search box; then follow “Citation References”
hyperlink; then filter to cases; then filter to Supreme Court cases). See, e.g.,
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying the Katz reasonableness
test); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983) (same); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining whether a particular form
of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz . . . .”); JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C.
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME ONE 71 (6th ed. 2013)
(“In 2012, however, the Supreme Court surprised those who accepted the
conventional wisdom (including four sitting members of the Court) by announcing
that Katz did not displace the prior property-rights approach.”).
209. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
210. See id. at 125 (“[W]e conclude that . . . the field test was reasonable. The
law enforcement interests justifying the procedure were substantial.”).
211. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (citing
Olmstead solely for the purpose of noting that it was overruled by Katz);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1991) (noting that Olmstead was
overruled by Katz); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“[I]n
Katz . . . the Court overruled Olmstead saying the Fourth Amendment reach
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.” (citation omitted)); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971)
(discussing how Katz overruled previous doctrines related to wiretapping such as
the one articulated in Olmstead); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 210, at 69
(6th ed. 2013) (discussing how Olmstead was overruled by Katz).
212. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“We have since
decoupled violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation of his property.”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92, 97 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Katz test is “notoriously unhelpful” and
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Jones, Justice Scalia restates a version of a comment he made in
other opinions: “Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at
least until the latter half of the 20th century.”213 He also states,
“Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively
property-based approach.”214 These comments in Jones are
generally consistent with prior statements made by Justice Scalia,
but his earlier statements were more forceful. In a concurring
opinion in Minnesota v. Carter,215 and a majority opinion in Kyllo
v. United States,216 Justice Scalia appeared far less convinced that
the trespass doctrine was standing quietly on the sidelines,
waiting to be sent into the game. In Carter, Justice Scalia rails
against the Katz test, at least as a method of determining whether
the Fourth Amendment applies in a given situation.217 He never
asserts, however, that the trespass doctrine is still in play.218 In
Kyllo, he seems to find a middle ground where, although not happy
with the Katz test, he still applies it.219 Kyllo provides some of the
strongest indications that, at least at the time of the decision,
Justice Scalia had accepted the fact that an independent trespass
doctrine no longer existed.
In Carter, Justice Scalia concurred with the majority, which
applied the Katz test to the case, but wrote separately.220 His
stated reason in writing a separate opinion was to express his view
that the parties to the case had given “short shrift” to the text of

reviewing the history and language of the Fourth Amendment without discussing
trespass as a doctrine that should be applied).
213. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (paraphrasing his comments from Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 32–35 and Carter, 525 U.S. at 91–99).
214. Id. at 405.
215. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
216. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
217. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97–98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Katz as
“the notoriously unhelpful test adopted in a ‘benchmark’ decision”).
218. See id. (criticizing the Katz standard for determining Fourth Amendment
violations without expressly mentioning the trespass doctrine).
219. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (relying on the Katz test for determining “the
minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable”).
220. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the Constitution.221 Justice Scalia believed the parties had done so
by leaping “to apply the fuzzy standard of ‘legitimate expectation
of privacy’—a consideration that is often relevant to whether a
search or seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment is
‘unreasonable’—to the threshold question whether a search or
seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment has occurred.”222
Although Justice Scalia concurred with the majority in the
outcome of the case, it was for a very different reason.223 In fact,
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the “parties” in the case appears to also
be leveled at the majority.224 The majority repeatedly tied its
conclusions to the Katz formulation.225 Chief Justice Rehnquist
uses the phrase “legitimate expectation of privacy” six times in his
three pages of analysis of the case.226 In the analysis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized the connection between property and the
Fourth Amendment, not as a separate test, but as a component of
the Katz “legitimate expectation of privacy” test.227
Later in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the
dissent for arguing that the majority opinion failed to properly
apply the Katz test.228 As part of that criticism, Justice Scalia

221. Id. at 91.
222. Id. at 91–92.
223. Id. at 92–97. Justice Scalia’s argument in favor of the outcome in the case
is based on an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. He argues
that the text of the Constitution provides a ready answer for whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to the situation in Carter. Id. Since the search in the case did
not involve the home of the defendants, they had no textual basis for claiming a
Fourth Amendment violation. Id.
224. See id. at 111 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (determining Scalia’s purpose for
writing separately was partly to critique the majority’s application and
understanding of the text of the Fourth Amendment).
225. See id. at 85–92 (majority opinion) citing the Katz expectation of privacy).
226. Id. at 87–91.
227. See id. at 90 (“Property used for commercial purposes is treated
differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property. ‘An
expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and
indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.’”).
228. See id. at 97–98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent believes that ‘our
obligation to produce coherent results’ requires that we ignore [the Fourth
Amendment], and apply instead [Katz].”).
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expressed his view that the Katz test was “notoriously unhelpful”
and “self-indulgent.”229 He goes on to write:
[T]he only thing the past three decades have established about
the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by
Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz . . . ) is that,
unsurprisingly, those “actual (subjective) expectations of
privacy” “that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable,’” . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable. 230

Despite this apparently damning critique of the Katz test,
Justice Scalia claimed in a footnote to agree with Justice Harlan’s
opinion at least in some respects.231 In particular, Justice Scalia
appears to agree with Justice Harlan’s statement in Katz that the
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to people,
“requires reference to a ‘place.’”232
Justice Scalia’s concurrence is best understood as an advocacy
piece against the Katz test. He asserts the test is inconsistent with
the text of the Fourth Amendment, unhelpful and self-indulgent.233
Although he claims in footnote three to be in some respects in
harmony with the Katz test, that harmony is limited. Despite the
focus of his concurrence, Justice Scalia never asserts that the
trespass test is still viable and should be applied.234

229. Id. at 97.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 98 n.3 (“I am entirely in harmony with [Justice Harlan’s
concurring] opinion.”).
232. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
233. See id. at 97 (criticizing Katz as a “notoriously unhelpful . . . selfindulgent test”).
234. It could be argued that Justice Scalia did not raise the trespass test in
this case because it would not have resolved the issues at hand. To apply the
trespass test would only produce the obvious answer that visiting someone else’s
home did not make it your ‘property’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The Carter case would clearly turn on whether Katz was satisfied or
not. However, that is not what Justice Scalia suggested. Instead he argued that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply in the Carter case because to do so would
stretch the language of the Fourth Amendment to the breaking point. Id. at 92.
He argues that Katz should only apply when determining whether a search or
seizure was reasonable, not when determining whether a search or seizure
occurred. Id.
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Next, Justice Scalia discussed the Katz formulation in Kyllo v.
United States.235 In that opinion, despite continuing to criticize the
test, he nonetheless applied it.236 The Kyllo decision is an
important Fourth Amendment case for a number of reasons, but
for the purposes of this discussion, it is important because it
appears to include statements counter to the Jones case.237 Of
particular significance is Justice Scalia’s statement stating that
“[w]e have since decoupled violation of a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”238
The most compelling aspect of Justice Scalia’s criticism of Katz
is his observation that the Katz test could be used to reduce privacy
in places that were formerly protected under the trespass
doctrine.239 Correcting this potential flaw in the Katz test,
however, does not require the trespass doctrine to exist
independent of the Katz formulation. Rather than declaring the
existence of a “dormant trespass doctrine,”240 at least two better
alternatives were present. First, Justice Scalia could have argued
that the protections contained in the trespass doctrine were
incorporated, or intended to be incorporated, as part of the Katz
test. This line of argument would seem entirely consistent with
Justice Harlan’s opinion in Katz.241 Further, the opinions that
Justice Scalia cites in Jones would fit much more clearly as
supportive of this theory rather than the one Justice Scalia
235. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
236. See id. at 33 (explaining how “a Fourth Amendment search occurs when
the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes
as reasonable” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361(1967))).
237. Compare id. at 32 (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”), with
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (supposing that Katz added to
the breadth of possible Fourth Amendment violations).
238. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
239. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (noting that using Katz exclusively “eliminates
rights that previously existed”).
240. See id. at 405 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test); see also
cases cited supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s
statements regarding trespass in Jones).
241. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (questioning “what
protection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to . . . people. Generally, as here, the
answer to that question requires reference to a ‘place’”).
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describes in Jones. Second, he could have accepted that Katz
overturned the trespass doctrine, but argued that was an error.
Either way, it was unnecessary for Justice Scalia to assert that the
trespass doctrine was merely an unused theory that could now be
put into the Court’s Fourth Amendment line-up.
c. Illinois v. Caballes
The final example of a non-credible use of stare decisis in a
recent Fourth Amendment opinion is presented in Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion in Illinois v. Caballes.242 Caballes,
briefly discussed supra, dealt with the use of a dog sniff during a
traffic stop.243 Among the issues Justice Stevens discussed in
Caballes was the impact of the Kyllo decision on the Court’s
opinion.244 The Respondent in Caballes argued that Kyllo stood for
the idea that the government could not use “non-intrusive”
investigative techniques if such actions would reveal information
that was contained in a private location.245 Justice Stevens, who
dissented in Kyllo, took the opportunity presented in writing the
majority opinion in Caballes to, in effect, rewrite Kyllo.246
The Kyllo decision is one of several Fourth Amendment
decisions by the Supreme Court that sought to confront the
challenge created by technology’s capacity to infringe on
traditionally private places.247 In Kyllo, law enforcement used a
thermal imaging device to observe the relative heat escaping from
242. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
243. Supra notes 129–138 and accompanying text.
244. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (concluding that the decision is “entirely
consistent” with Kyllo).
245. Brief for Respondent at 14, 15, 18, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 2097415.
246. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 316–17 (2010)
[hereinafter MacDonnell, Orwellian] (“[Justice Stevens’s] claim that the Kyllo
case turned on the fact that the device in question could pick up lawful or intimate
details as well as unlawful activity in the home is not supported by the opinion.”).
247. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by . . . technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,’ . . . constitutes a search.”).
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Kyllo’s home and garage as compared to his neighbors.248 This
exam revealed that there was more heat escaping from Kyllo’s
home than that of his neighbors.249 The government used this
along with other information to secure a search warrant.250 The
search revealed that Kyllo had approximately 100 marijuana
plants in his home.251 The question before the Court was whether
the use of the thermal-imaging device on Kyllo’s home violated the
Fourth Amendment.252 The Court found that it did.253
The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and has
been discussed previously.254 However, one aspect of Justice
Scalia’s opinion not addressed was his discussion of intrusiveness.
The government in Kyllo argued that the thermal imaging device
“did not detect private activities occurring in private areas,”255 and
thus did not reveal “intimate details” of the home.256 In response
to this argument, Justice Scalia wrote:
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been
tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained. In Silverman, for example, we made clear that any
physical invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a
fraction of an inch,” was too much, . . . 365 U. S. at 512, and
there is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for
the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees
nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the

248. Id. at 29.
249. Id. at 30.
250. See id. (“Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal
imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of
petitioner’s home.”).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 29.
253. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
254. Supra notes 216–219, 235–238 and accompanying text.
255. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (internal quotations
omitted).
256. Id.
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home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.257

Justice Scalia then went on to explain, “Limiting the
prohibition of thermal imaging to ‘intimate details’ would not only
be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application.”258 So,
Justice Scalia identified two reasons that the “intimate detail”
argument fails. First, all details of the home are considered
intimate details.259 Second, any effort to create an “intimate
details” test would be virtually impossible to administer.260
Justice Stevens dissented in Kyllo.261 Among his several
arguments against the majority, Justice Stevens argued against
Justice Scalia’s intimate details discussion.262 In his attack, Justice
Stevens claimed that the device used provided no details about the
inside of the home, but only information about the exterior of the
home.263 In this section of his dissent, Justice Stevens seems to
understand Justice Scalia’s argument regarding the asserted
“intimate details” test.264 Justice Stevens wrote:
the Court argues that the permissibility of “through-the-wall
surveillance” cannot depend on a distinction between observing
“intimate details” such as “the lady of the house [taking] her
daily sauna and bath,” and noticing only “the non-intimate rug
on the vestibule floor” or “objects no smaller than 36 by 36
inches.”265

In Justice Stevens’s majority opinion from Caballes he recast
the Kyllo decision.266 Justice Stevens wrote: “Critical to [Kyllo] was
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 38.
259. See id. at 37 (“In the home . . . all details are intimate details.”).
260. See id. at 38–39 (describing the would-be difficulties in applying such a
rule).
261. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 49–52 (criticizing Justice Scalia’s argument).
263. See id. at 50 (describing that the thermal images show the outside of the
house).
264. See generally id. at 49–52.
265. Id. at 50.
266. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“This conclusion is
entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging
device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful
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the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity—
in that case, intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”267
There are several components of the above quote that are
noteworthy. First, the question of whether the thermal imaging
device in Kyllo could detect lawful or unlawful activity was simply
not a matter of significance.268 Second, although the Court
discussed the concept of intimate details, Justice Scalia made clear
that all details of the home are intimate.269 Third, the example
Justice Stevens provided implied that the decision turned on the
distinction between an intimate and non-intimate detail when it
did not.270 Given Justice Stevens’s apparent commitment to this
issue in Kyllo and Caballes,271 his account of Kyllo appears weakly
trustworthy.
In Caballes, Justice Stevens seems to be trying to achieve
what he could not in his dissent from Kyllo. The question of
whether law enforcement can use a “binary” search method to
detect contraband in a traditionally protected area was clearly part

search.”).
267. Id. at 409–10.
268. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–40 (2001) (noting that a
limitation on only intimate details would be both wrong and “impractical” and
there is a “firm line at the entrance to the house” regardless of the intimacy of the
details discovered).
269. See id. at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”
(emphasis in original)).
270. See id. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the imager was only
able to identify heat emanating from the house and not able to “identify either
the lady of the house [in her bath], the rug on the floor, or anything else inside
the house” and therefore did not qualify as a Fourth Amendment violation).
271. See id. (stating that the majority assumes that the thermal imager
could observe intimate details of the home); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 409–10 (2005) (“Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the
[thermal-imaging] device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case
intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”).
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of Justice Stevens’s objective in Caballes.272 In his dissent in Kyllo,
Justice Stevens argued that the majority decision was too broad:
It is clear, however, that the category of “sense-enhancing
technology” covered by the new rule, ibid., is far too broad. It
would, for example, embrace potential mechanical substitutes
for dogs trained to react when they sniff narcotics. But in United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707 (1983), we held that a dog
sniff that “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics”
does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,” and it must follow that sense-enhancing
equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is not a
search either. Nevertheless, the use of such a device would be
unconstitutional under the Court’s rule . . . .273

The rewriting of Kyllo through Caballes would arguably
permit sense-enhancing technology so long as it only revealed the
presence or absence of a thing that was illegal to possess.274 Under
Justice Stevens’s new formulation, which would distinguish
between legal intimate detail activity and illegal non-intimate
details, dog sniffs or their equivalent would be permissible.275
Consistent with the other cases discussed in this section,
Justice Stevens’s rewrite of the Kyllo decision was unnecessary, at
least to achieve the outcome in the case. Justice Stevens could have
easily argued that the dog sniff was permissible based on the lesser
degree of privacy present in automobiles. This argument, coupled
with the Court’s line of cases applying the binary search doctrine
or contraband exception,276 would have provided an adequate basis
272. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (concluding that “the use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests”).
273. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (explaining that “any
interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus,
governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest’”).
275. See id. at 410 (concluding that dog sniffs “conducted during a concededly
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth
Amendment”). But see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013)
(addressing the use of a drug detection dog on the home).
276. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (concluding that
a roadblock checkpoint program was an improper search and detention but
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to permit the dog sniff without reference to Kyllo or the need to
rejigger the decision.
Each of the above cases demonstrates Justices reducing the
persuasiveness of their opinions, whether majority or dissent, by
asserting claims regarding precedent that are weakly credible or
simply untenable. Not only were each of the three positions
discussed above unsupportable, but they were also unnecessary. In
each of the three cases the Justices’ characterizations of precedent
were unnecessary to the argument in favor of the outcome the
Justice was advocating. Ultimately, the mischaracterization of the
precedent only served to weaken the persuasiveness of the
Justices’ opinions.
2. Practical Wisdom
Despite describing ethos as “almost . . . the most authoritative
form of persuasion,”277 Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom in
The Rhetoric is barely a few lines.278 Fortunately, he elaborated on
the concept in another work, the Nicomachean Ethics.279 In that
work, Aristotle explained “[a]gain, the work of man is achieved
only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as moral virtue;
stating that a general canine sniff was not); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 566
(1999) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to seize
a vehicle where the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle itself was
contraband); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may
search an automobile and the containers within it [without a warrant] where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984) (“[I]t is well-settled that it is
constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that
cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on
probable cause to believe they contain contraband.”); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he [police dog] sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells
the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information
obtained is limited.”). See generally MacDonnell, Orwellian, supra note 237.
277. ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 39.
278. See id. at 69 (translating phronēsis as practical wisdom).
279. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 168 (J.M. Mitchell ed.,
Rev. D.P. Chase trans., George Routledge & Sons, Limited 3rd ed.1910) (c. 384
B.C.E.) (“As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to
what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.”).
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for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom
makes us take the right means.”280 Scholars in the field of rhetoric
have characterized Aristotle’s view on practical wisdom as
including “practical intelligence”281 or “prudence.”282 In this
Article, practical wisdom in the Fourth Amendment context means
opinions that can be applied in a practical way on the streets and
in the courtrooms of the United States.
This section will discuss two majority opinions and one
concurrence. The first opinion is Justice Souter’s majority opinion
in Georgia v. Randolph.283 Randolph deals with whether police
may enter a home without a warrant when one resident of a home
consents and another does not.284 The second opinion is Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Ontario v. Quon.285 Quon
dealt with an employee’s privacy in electronic communication
when the Government issued the device being searched.286 The
third opinion is Justice Alito’s concurrence in United States v.
Jones.287 In each of the above opinions there is a serious question
of how these cases will or would be applied either, by the police or
the courts.

280. Id. at bk. VI., at chpt. 12, 13, p. 1144a.
281. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 634 (Thomas O. Sloan et. al. eds., 2001)
(explaining “rhetoric is an exercise of the practical intellect”).
282. Id. It is important to acknowledge that Aristotle’s discussion of practical
wisdom in Nicomachean Ethics goes far beyond the use of rhetoric. Aristotle’s
discussion of practical wisdom is part of a broader work on what it is to lead a
fruitful life. It is also important to note that Aristotle’s discussion of practical
wisdom is not as clearly separated from virtue as this Article approaches the
subject.
283. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
284. See id. at 106 (“The question here is whether such an evidentiary seizure
is likewise lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other . . . is
present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.”).
285. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
286. See id. at 750 (“This case involves the assertion by a government
employer of the right . . . to read text messages sent and received on a pager the
employer owned and issued to an employee.”).
287. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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a. Georgia v. Randolph

Georgia v. Randolph was the first time the Supreme Court
sought to resolve the circumstance where one resident gives police
permission to search a home but another denies police entry.288 In
Randolph, the defendant’s wife contacted police after a domestic
dispute with her husband.289 Police arrived and Mrs. Randolph
informed them that the defendant was a drug user and there were
drugs in the home.290 The defendant denied being a drug user.291
Police asked Mr. Randolph for permission to search the home,
which he refused.292 Police asked Mrs. Randolph for permission,
which she granted.293 The search revealed evidence of drug use in
the room alleged to be Mr. Randolph’s.294 Mr. Randolph, who was
indicted for possession of cocaine, challenged the search on Fourth
Amendment grounds.295 The trial court denied Mr. Randolph’s
motion, but that ruling was overturned on appeal.296 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and upheld the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s ruling that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.297
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that the
police could not conduct a warrantless search of a home based on
the consent of one of the tenants if another tenant was present and
refusing consent.298 The practicality of the opinion can be
288. The Supreme Court had already resolved several cases, including United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), that confirmed that the co-resident of a
home could consent to a warrantless search of the residence he or she shared with
another and evidence seized was admissible against the non-consenting resident.
Id. at 174–76.
289. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 107–08.
297. Id. at 123.
298. See id. at 123 (stating that “[Mr.] Randolph’s refusal is clear, and nothing
in the record justifies the search on grounds independent of [Mrs.] Randolph’s
consent”).
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challenged both by how police would interpret and execute it and
as precedent for future cases.
Justice Souter began his opinion by reemphasizing the
importance of the home to the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.299 He pointed out that the warrantless search of a
home is per se unreasonable and any exceptions to this rule are
“jealously and carefully drawn.”300 One such exception he
discussed at length was the consent of a co-occupant.301 He
explained that although a co-occupant may grant consent, that
consent cannot overcome the refusal of another physically present
co-occupant.302 The argument seems reasonable up to this point.
Rather than basing his opinion on the foundation that one person’s
right to permit a search cannot trump another’s right to refuse it,
Justice Souter instead arrives at his conclusion based on “widely
shared social expectations.”303 Further, Justice Souter insists on
adding another wrinkle to the opinion. In order to avoid disturbing
other Supreme Court precedent and in an attempt to connect the
ruling more closely to the social expectation line of reasoning,
Justice Souter requires that the resident refusing consent to a
police search be present.304
The practicality of Justice Souter’s opinion can be evaluated
in at least three ways. First, is the decision clear and easily
applied? Second, is it fashioned in such a way that it fulfills its
purpose in light of human behavior? Third, is it built upon a line
of reasoning that permits lower courts to apply the decision to
future circumstances? Justice Souter’s opinion misses the mark on
two of these three objectives.
299. Id. at 109.
300. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
301. See id. at 109 (explaining that the exception might include “the
householder against whom evidence is sought, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222 (1973), or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over
property, when the suspect is absent”).
302. Id. at 121.
303. Id. at 111.
304. See id. at 121–22 (stating that “there is practical value in the simple
clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when
there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the
fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it”).
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Randolph’s greatest strength is its immediate clarity. The
opinion lays down a bright—albeit narrow—rule for police to
follow: In the circumstance where two residents are present and
one gives permission to search a home and the other refuses, the
police may not search without a warrant.305
Despite Justice Souter’s reemphasis of the Court’s precedent
that warrantless searches of homes are usually per se
unreasonable and that the exceptions to this rule are few and
narrow,306 his opinion does little to practically protect Fourth
Amendment rights. By requiring that the defendant be physically
present at the exact moment police are seeking entry based on
another resident’s consent,307 there is little protection to the
Fourth Amendment rights Justice Souter extoled. In addition to
requiring an unlikely confluence of events to occur for a defendant
to protect his or her Fourth Amendment rights, it limits the
protection to a specific moment in time. Unless a defendant can
remain home and always vigilant, police may simply return when
the defendant is not home. Further, by requiring the defendant to,
in effect, stand in the door and deny police entry, the Randolph
opinion provides the perverse incentive to simply remove the
defendant from the equation—which is exactly what occurred in
Fernandez v. California.308 Despite declaring that “[d]isputed
permission is thus no match for this central value of the Fourth
305. See id. at 122–23 (“A physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of
consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a
fellow occupant.”).
306. Id. at 109.
307. Id. at 122–23.
308. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). In Fernandez, the defendant told police they could
not enter the home. Id. at 1130. Because law enforcement suspected Fernandez
of committing domestic violence and other offenses against his wife, they arrested
him. Id. An hour after the arrest, police asked Mrs. Fernandez for permission to
search the home and she granted them permission. Id. Justice Alito, writing for
the majority, took Justice Souter at his word and limited the Randolph case to
exactly the circumstance where the non-consenting resident stands in the door
preventing police from entering the home. Id. at 1137. But see Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006) (“So long as there is no evidence that the
police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the
sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in . . .
complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission . . . [one]
according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication . . . .”).
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Amendment,”309 Justice Souter’s opinion does little to actually
protect those Fourth Amendment values.
At the conclusion of his opinion, Justice Souter explained that,
to preserve the Court’s precedent in other consent cases, his
opinion had to be constrained to circumstances where two
residents are physically present.310 Justice Souter appears,
however, to overstate the demands of the Court’s precedent. The
two cases Justice Souter cites are Matlock v. United States311 and
Illinois v. Rodriguez.312 Each case dealt with a non-defendant
apparent resident giving consent to police to conduct a warrantless
search of the residence they shared with the defendant.313 In
Matlock, police detained the defendant in a police car outside the
residence, but never asked for his permission to conduct a
search.314 In Rodriguez, the defendant was asleep in the residence
when police entered.315 What is noteworthy about both cases is that
neither defendant had refused the police request for consent to
search.316 Thus, neither decision dictated that a defendant’s
refusal to grant consent must be limited to standing at the door to
block police entry. Justice Souter’s majority opinion resolves but a
moment in time and encourages law enforcement to be minimally
inventive to ensure a suspect is not able to literally stand in their
way.
In addition to having a limited practical effect when applied
by law enforcement, Justice Souter’s majority opinion is also
practically limited as precedent. This practical limitation stems
from Justice Souter’s reliance on “widely shared social
309. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115.
310. See id. at 120–22 (“If those cases are not to be undercut . . . we have to
admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest
in objecting is in fact at the door and objects . . . .”).
311. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
312. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
313. Id. at 179; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
314. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
315. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
316. See id. (explaining that Rodriguez was asleep in the apartment when the
police were given consent to search and access to the apartment); see also Matlock,
415 U.S. at 166 (noting that police arrested Matlock in front of his home, but
never asked him for his consent to search it—another occupant gave the consent
to search).
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expectations”317 rather than the long line of cases that focus on
privacy in the home.
In Randolph, the only question in play was whether one
resident could, through their consent, veto the nonconsenting
resident’s refusal.318 Justice Souter declared they could not.319 By
tying his opinion to the “widely held social expectation”320 that a
person would not enter a home when given conflicting directions
from residents of the home, lower courts have an answer to one
question and nothing more. Additionally, there are multiple
“widely held social expectations.” Why limit the question to the
social expectation of a confrontation at the front door? Is it any less
a social expectation that people should not enter a home where
they are not welcome? Or why not focus on the social expectation
that when we tell the police they do not have consent to search our
homes without a warrant, our home will not be searched without a
warrant? Additionally, the Randolph opinion is a precedent built
upon the shifting sands of “social expectations.”321 If the
circumstances in Randolph were different regarding the two
residents, would the Fourth Amendment rights of the
nonconsenting resident change? In his dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts points this out, stating “[t]he fact is that a wide variety of
differing social situations can readily be imagined, giving rise to
quite different social expectations.”322
Because of these weaknesses, Justice Souter’s opinion in
Randolph has been strictly limited to the facts of the case. In
Fernandez v. California, Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
found that the Court’s decision in Randolph only prevents police
317. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).
318. Id. at 106. This question can of course, be turned on its head to ask
whether the refusing resident vetoes the consenting resident’s action. Chief
Justice Roberts turned the question around this way in his dissent. Id. at 129
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 142 (stating “that a physically present inhabitant’s express
refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the
consent of a fellow occupant”).
320. Id. at 111.
321. See id. at 121 (providing the question in the case to be “whether
customary social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority powerful
enough to prevail over the co-tenant's objection”).
322. Id. at 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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from entering a home when the defendant is present and objecting
to the warrantless search.323 Further, in Fernandez the Court’s
decision made it entirely permissible for police to remove a
nonconsenting resident and then proceed with a consent search.324
b. The City of Ontario v. Quon
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Ontario v. Quon
presents a question of practical wisdom with regard to the
precedential value of the opinion. In addition to resolving the case
at hand, an appellate court—especially the United States Supreme
Court—is expected to create clear precedent that lower courts can
easily follow. Central to this activity is describing a rule and any
limiting principles the Supreme Court expects lower courts to
follow. In Quon, Justice Kennedy refused to choose between two
different rules and thus left lower courts continuing to guess as to
what the proper rule is.325
In Quon, a police officer brought a section 1983 action326
against the City of Ontario, California, for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights.327 Officer Quon and other members of the
police force were issued electronic pagers that allowed the officers
to send text messages.328 Officers were told the pagers were for
work use only and were limited in how many text messages they

323. See 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1136 (2014) (“If Randolph is taken at its word—that
it applies only when the objector is standing in the door saying ‘stay out’ when
officers propose to make a consent search—all of these problems [of how officers
should treat objections] disappear.”).
324. See id. at 1134 (“The Randolph dictum is best understood not to require
an inquiry into the subjective intent of officers who detain or arrest a potential
objector but instead refer to situations in which the removal of the potential
objector is not objectively reasonable.”).
325. See 560 U.S. 746, 757 (2010) (explaining that the two different
approaches outlined in the plurality and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
O’Connor v. Ortega lead to the same result in this case—without choosing one
approach over the other).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing civil actions for deprivation of
constitutional and federal statutory rights by persons acting “under color of law”).
327. Quon, 560 U.S. at 753.
328. Id. at 751.
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could send per week.329 Officer Quon repeatedly exceeded his use
of the pager and had to pay the overage fees several times.330
Although Officer Quon’s supervisor warned him about running
over the text limit, he also told Officer Quon that he did not intend
to audit the text messages to insure they were work related.331
Eventually, Officer Quon’s supervisor did audit the text messages
and discovered abuses.332 Based on that discovery Officer Quon
was disciplined.333 Officer Quon brought a section 1983 action
against the City for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.334
The Quon case required the Court to resolve the question of
what level of privacy the Fourth Amendment requires in the work
place when the government is the employer.335 The leading case in
this area was O’Connor v. Ortega.336 Justice Kennedy noted that
the Court in O’Connor did not agree on the “analytical framework
for Fourth Amendment claims against government employers.”337
He then went on to discuss at length the proposed framework
provided by the plurality and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
O’Connor.338
The O’Connor plurality declared that “[s]earches and seizures
by government employers or supervisors of the private property of
their employees . . . are subject to the restraints of the Fourth
Amendment.”339 The plurality stated, however, that given the
operational realities of some government offices, employees may
329. Id. at 751–52.
330. Id. at 752.
331. Id.
332. See id. at 752–53 (discovering “that many of the messages sent and
received on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually
explicit”).
333. Id. at 753
334. Id.
335. See id. at 750 (“This case involves the assertion by a government
employer of the right . . . to read text messages sent and received on a pager the
employer owned and issued to an employee.”).
336. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
337. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010).
338. See id. at 756–57 (stating that the “four-Justice plurality concluded that
the correct analysis has two steps” and “Justice Scalia, concurring in the
judgment, outlined a different approach”).
339. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
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have no reasonable expectation of privacy.340 Further, based on the
wide variety of possible work environments such cases had to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.341 The plurality also found that
there are “special needs” present when the government is also an
employer.342 The “special needs” render the normal probable cause
and warrant requirements impracticable when the government is
engaged in “legitimate work-related, non-investigatory intrusions
as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.”343 The
plurality substituted the usual requirement of probable cause with
a standard of “reasonableness under all the circumstances.”344
In O’Connor, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence where he
challenged the method the plurality proposed.345 Justice Scalia’s
dissatisfaction with the plurality was two-fold. First, he rejected
the value of a case-by-case approach as too vague and difficult for
lower courts and law enforcement to follow.346 Second, Justice
Scalia asserted that whatever standard the plurality suggested
would be the wrong one if it resulted in a conclusion that the
Fourth Amendment did not generally apply to a government
employee’s office.347
The plurality and Justice Scalia offer different methods of
addressing searches by the government of the workplace. The
plurality created a test that was highly fact dependent, both with
340. Id. at 717.
341. Id. at 718.
342. Id. at 725.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 726. According to the plurality, this test is comprised of two steps:
“first, one must consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its
inception . . . second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
345. See id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the reason for the
reversal given by the plurality opinion, and with the standard it prescribes for the
Fourth Amendment inquiry.”).
346. See id. at 730 (“I would object to the formulation of a standard so devoid
of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”).
347. Id. at 730–32. Justice Scalia did not suggest an iron-clad rule regarding
government employee offices—he suggested that there may be some offices so
“exposed to the public” that they would “not be subject to the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 731.
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regard to whether the Fourth Amendment would apply and
whether the search was reasonable.348 Justice Scalia clearly
rejected the case-by-case approach, at least with regard to the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment applied to government
employee offices.349 He ultimately concluded that when the
government is an employer the special need doctrine should apply,
so long as the search is work-related.350
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Quon manifests a
timidity that calls into question the decision to grant certiorari in
the first place. After describing the plurality in O’Connor and
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, Justice Kennedy explains that under
either test the search in this case would be reasonable.351 Using
phrases like “were we to assume that inquiry into ‘operational
realities’ were called for,”352 “[e]ven if the Court were certain that
the O’Connor plurality approach were the right one,”353 and “with
boundaries that we need not here explore,”354 Justice Kennedy
writes much but says little. In fact, Justice Kennedy wrote a
two-page explanation of why the Court “must proceed with care
when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a
government employer.”355 He continued with the statement that
“[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear.”356
348. See id. at 725–26 (“We hold . . . that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees . . . should
be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”)
349. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
350. See id. at 732 (“I would hold that government searches to retrieve
work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules . . . do not
violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
351. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764–65 (2010) (stating “the
search was reasonable under the approach of the O’Connor plurality” and “would
satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concurrence”).
352. Id. at 758.
353. Id. at 759.
354. Id. at 762.
355. Id. at 759. Justice Kennedy’s explanation begins on 759 and ends on
761.
356. Id.
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The Quon decision was published in 2010. It would be an
overstatement to declare that pagers, even those capable of
transmitting text messages, were an emerging technology in 2010.
Justice Kennedy, however, while noting that in Katz the Court was
able to rely on its own knowledge and experience to arrive at its
conclusions, found that in the current case “[i]t is not so clear that
courts at present are on so sure a ground.”357 It is very likely that
the Justices of the Katz Court were more comfortable with deciding
a case involving a public telephone than the Justices of the Quon
Court were when resolving an issue regarding a pager. But it is
likely that the Justices in Katz knew no more about how a phone
transmits messages than the Quon Court knew about how text
pagers work. Further, since it seems likely that the average citizen
(and certainly Officer Quon) knows no more about how text
messages arrive at their proper destination than they understand
how telephones work, the entire issue is beside the point. Finally,
even if text pagers were a new technology and it mattered how the
information was transmitted, we still expect the Supreme Court to
resolve the issues.
c. Justice Alito in United States v. Jones
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones has already been
discussed above.358 As previously mentioned, the Court divided
sharply on the question of what role the Katz test should play in
resolving whether the government’s warrantless use of a GPS
tracking device violated the Fourth Amendment.359 Justice Alito
wrote a concurring opinion arguing against the resurrection of the
trespass test, claiming instead that the Katz test was the proper
measure of whether and how the Fourth Amendment should be
applied in the present and future.360 The focus of this discussion of

357. Id.
358. See generally supra Part III.A.1.b.
359. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
360. See id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (reasoning that “Katz v. United
States . . . finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not
required for a Fourth Amendment violation”).
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Justice Alito’s concurrence is on his description and explanation of
how the Katz test should be applied.
The core of Justice Alito’s challenge to the majority opinion in
Jones was his claim that tying the Court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis to “18th-century tort law . . . was unwise.”361 Instead,
Justice Alito and the three Justices that joined in his concurrence
argued the Katz test was the better method.362 As part of his
argument, Justice Alito agreed with the majority that “we must
‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted’. . . . But it
is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that
are analogous to what took place in this case.”363 To illustrate this
point Justice Alito wrote in a footnote, “The Court suggests that
something like this [referring to the facts in Jones] might have
occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic
coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable
with incredible fortitude and patience.”364
Although Justice Alito was critical of the majority’s method of
resolving Jones, he agreed with the outcome.365 He arrived at that
conclusion by finding the government’s actions violated Jones’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.366 In his fourteen-page
concurrence, Justice Alito devotes approximately a page to
explaining how the Katz test should be applied to the facts in
Jones, seeming to say that some warrantless GPS monitoring is

361. Id. at 418–19.
362. See id. at 430 (arguing that the Court should apply “existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine” of the Katz test, and “ask whether the use of GPS tracking
in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would
not have anticipated”).
363. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001)).
364. Id. at 420 n.3.
365. See id. at 431 (“For these reasons, I conclude that the lengthy monitoring
that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. I
therefore agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be affirmed.”).
366. See id. at 419 (“I would analyze the question presented in this case by
asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”).
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acceptable while others is not.367 He wrote “[u]nder this approach
[referring to the use of a GPS tracking device], relatively
short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable.”368 He then explained, “[b]ut the use of
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy.”369 Then, anticipating the
obvious questions the above sentence begs, he wrote: “We need not
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the
4-week mark”370 and “[w]e also need not consider whether
prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations
involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a
constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”371
The practical application of Justice Alito’s formulation leaves
significant gaps both for police and lower courts. Under his
approach, warrantless GPS tracking of vehicles would be
permissible, but only for a short-term.372 But how short is
short-term? Justice Alito stated it is unnecessary for the Court to
answer that question.373 Further, he suggests the nature of the
offense will impact on the use of warrantless GPS tracking, but he
offers no explanation of what offenses fall into his category of “most
offenses”374 and what offenses are “extraordinary.”375 Justice Alito
suggests a sliding scale of Fourth Amendment protection based on
the offense being investigated, but he offers no precedent to
367. See id. at 429–30 (discussing the perceived reasonableness of different
types of monitoring).
368. Id. at 430.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 431.
372. See id. at 430 (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society
has recognized as reasonable.”).
373. See id. (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the
4–week mark.”).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 431.
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support this proposed method.376 Further, under this sliding scale
approach, would there be offenses that were so minor that no
degree of warrantless GPS monitoring would be appropriate?
In his book, The Nature of the Judicial Process,377 Justice
Cardozo wrote, “[t]here can be no wisdom in the choice of a path
unless we know where it will lead.”378 Later in the same book he
explained “the common law is at bottom the philosophy of
pragmatism”379 and “[t]he rule that functions well produces a title
deed to recognition.”380 Both the Randolph and Quon majority
opinions miss these core components of an effective judicial
decision. In Randolph, Justice Souter’s opinion is impractical—it
claims to protect the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of
non-consenting residents against warrantless searches by police,
but only if they are literally present at the moment of entry.381
Implicit in the quote from Justice Cardozo is that a necessary step
to a wise choice is making a choice. Justice Kennedy not only fails
to make a choice, but he actually muddies the water. Of course, a
definitive rule that is wrong is worse than an ambiguous rule, but
if the Court cannot decide if a new rule is in order, it is better to
leave well enough alone. Finally, Justice Alito’s formulation of how
the Fourth Amendment should apply when law enforcement uses
GPS devices382 is so vague it would leave police and courts lost in
the undecided margins of his opinion.

376. See generally id. at 430–31.
377. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
378. Id. at 102.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 102–03.
381. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (“We hold that, in the
circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to
permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid
as to him.”).
382. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on
public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized
as reasonable. . . . But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” (citation omitted)).
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B. Pathos
In The Rhetoric, Aristotle acknowledges the importance of
appeals to emotion in persuasion but does so grudgingly.383 Some
of this discomfort in the use of pathos-based persuasion
undoubtedly comes from his teacher, Plato. Much of Plato’s attack
on rhetoric as a means to the truth centered on the heavy emphasis
teachers of rhetoric often placed on manipulating an audience’s
emotions.384 Despite Aristotle’s discomfort, a significant portion of
The Rhetoric is devoted to analyzing emotions and suggesting how
appeals to emotions could be used in argument.385
Throughout the history of the study of rhetoric, emotional
appeals have been unhappily recognized as effective.386 The
concern over persuasion through emotion has always been that
emotion will overcome reason.387 This concern seems especially
relevant when considering the opinions of Supreme Court
Justices.388 The essence of judicial decision making includes a
dispassionate weighing of the evidence in a case. The visual
depiction of justice on the steps of the Supreme Court building
includes an individual, blindfolded and carrying a set of scales.389
383. See generally ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 32.
384. See HERRICK, supra note 42, at 53 (“Plato so successfully anticipates the
major issues that attend rhetoric throughout its long history—issues like power,
the potential for manipulation . . . .”).
385. See generally ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 113 (discussing
“Propositions About the Emotions Useful to a Speaker in All Species of Rhetoric”
in Chapters 2–11).
386. See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2013) (“Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable
modes of persuasion . . . .”).
387. See id. at 1412 (“[I]t is portrayed as crucially important to narrowly
delineate that finite list and those proper roles, so that emotion doesn’t encroach
on the true preserve of law: which is reason.” (quoting SUSAN A. BANDES, THE
PASSIONS OF LAW 2 (1999))).
388. See Scharffs, supra note 84, at 754 (“Emotions such as anger, pity, fear,
hate, and love affect the reasoning abilities and legal decisions of a judge or
jury.”).
389. Images of Justice depicted as a woman with scales appears several times
within the Supreme Court building as well as outside. At least one image of
Justice depicted in the Supreme Court building is without a blindfold and without
scales. This is the image of Justice standing guard against evil. In this depiction,
Justice also has a sword. OFF. CURATOR, SUPREME CT. U.S., FIGURES OF JUSTICE
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The tradition of depicting “lady justice” with scales incorporates
the expectation that legal decisions will be issued impartially after
weighing both sides of a controversy.
Of course a fair and impartial opinion need not be
emotionless.390 Emotions influence Justices and they should use
appeals to emotion in their opinions. To remove emotion from
questions involving the Fourth Amendment would be to cut the
Amendment away from its fundamental roots.391 John Adams’s
famous description of the impact of James Otis’s legal arguments
against general warrants conveys the powerful emotions inherent
in the Fourth Amendment.392 So, Justices are called upon to walk
a thin line when advocating their position. There is an expectation
that any judge, and especially Supreme Court Justices, will be
temperate in their opinions. I suggest that in the Fourth
Amendment context, appeals to emotion are most legitimate when
directed to the emotions that enliven the Amendment. These
emotions include privacy, security,393 and practicality. The Fourth
Amendment protects deeply personal freedoms, but it qualifies
that protection with the critical descriptive of reasonableness.394
(2009),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/FiguresofJustice-9-11-2009approved.pdf.
390. See Greene, supra note 386, at 1395 (“There are several reasons to
believe, however, that pathetic argument is at least sometimes an appropriate
mode of persuasion in constitutional law.”).
391. See id. at 1400 (“Our assessment of the gravity of particular offenses and
our sentencing practices reflect moral judgments that may be inseparable from
the emotions those judgments both validate and produce.”).
392. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and
the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1005 (2011) [hereinafter Clancy,
Framers’ Intent]
Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did,
ready to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the
first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.
(quoting JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES VOLUME 10 247–48 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851)).
393. See CLANCY, supra note 23, at 77–83 (asserting that security, rather than
privacy, is the central protection the Fourth Amendment was directed toward
preserving).
394. See Clancy, Framers’ Intent, supra note 392, at 977 (“The first clause of
the Fourth Amendment requires that a search or seizure not be ‘unreasonable.’
This is the ‘fundamental command’ of the Amendment . . . .” (quoting New Jersey
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So, citizens are not protected against all governmental searches
and seizures, only those that are unreasonable.395 This becomes an
important qualifier on emotional appeals, especially those based
on individual privacy and security.
Below is a discussion of three recent Supreme Court opinions
where Justices engaged in pathos-based arguments that seem
wide of the mark. The first opinion discussed below is Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Maryland v. King,396 which
addressed a state statute that permitted taking DNA samples of
individuals arrested for felonies. The second opinion is Justice
Thomas’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part Safford
Unified School District v. Redding,397 which addressed the
permissibility of a warrantless “strip search” of a public school
child.398 The third opinion is Justice Stevens’s dissent in Samson
v. California,399 in which he argued against the permissibility of
blanket search authorizations for parolees.400
1. Maryland v. King
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion for the Court in
Maryland v. King. In King, the Court took up the issue of whether
a state statute authorizing the taking of a DNA swab of all
defendants arrested for certain felonies violated the Fourth

v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985))).
395. See id. (“Reasonableness is the measure of both the permissibility of the
initial decision to search and seize and the permissible scope of those
intrusions.”).
396. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
397. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
398. See id. at 368 (“The issue here is whether a 13–year–old student’s Fourth
Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and
underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had
brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”).
399. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
400. See id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But neither Knights nor Griffin
supports a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a blanket
grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safe-guards, by law enforcement
personnel who have no special interest in the welfare of the parolee or
probationer.”).
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Amendment.401 The defendant in King was convicted of rape based
primarily on DNA evidence secured as a result of a DNA swab
taken after he had been arrested for an unrelated crime.402 Justice
Kennedy, and four other Justices, determined that the statute did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.403 Aspects of Kennedy’s
majority opinion demonstrates a heavy emphasis on a
pathos-based argument, however, the emotional appeal seems
more directed at making the audience angry or outraged at the
actions of the defendant, rather than stirring emotions related to
the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, when Justice Kennedy does
discuss the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in the taking of
King’s DNA, he describes the intrusion as minimal because the
DNA was taken by use of a cheek swab.404 This superficial
discussion of intrusiveness seems to miss the emotive point of a
DNA-based intrusion. In this way Justice Kennedy’s pathos
argument endangers his persuasiveness as much, if not more, than
aids it.
Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in the following way:
In 2003 a man concealing his face and armed with a gun broke
into a woman’s home in Salisbury, Maryland. He raped her. The
police were unable to identify or apprehend the assailant based

401. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965 (“The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on
review of King’s rape conviction, ruled that the DNA taken when King was booked
for the 2009 charge was an unlawful seizure because obtaining and using the
cheek swab was an unreasonable search of the person.”).
402. See id. (“Additional DNA samples were taken from him and used in the
rape trial, but there seems to be no doubt that it was the DNA from the cheek
sample taken at the time he was booked in 2009 that led to his first having been
linked to the rape and charged with its commission.”).
403. See id. at 1980
When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for
a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be
detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate
police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
404. See id. at 1977 (“By comparison to this substantial government interest
and the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion of a cheek swab
to obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one.”).
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on any detailed description or other evidence they had, but they
did obtain from the victim a sample of the perpetrator’s DNA. 405

Next, he wrote, “In 2009 Alonzo King was arrested in
Wicomico County, Maryland, and charged with first- and
second-degree assault for menacing a group of people with a
shotgun.”406 As a reader, it is difficult to not imagine the plight of
the victims in the case. Also, it is equally difficult to not feel
outrage toward the defendant, who had committed the crimes of
rape and menacing, both crimes committed with weapons.
After his powerfully emotive opening, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion rambles through an explanation of the Maryland law that
authorized the taking of the DNA swab, the history of DNA and
the national DNA database (CODIS), before coming to the question
of whether taking the swab involved Fourth Amendment
interests.407 The objective of this discussion seems to be to lend
credibility to the DNA database system. The effect of this
discussion, however, is somewhat disorienting.
Ultimately Justice Kennedy relies upon the minimal physical
intrusion of the DNA test coupled with the reduced privacy interest
of individuals held in custody to justify the DNA program.408 Since
law enforcement investigatory needs are not a generally proper
basis for conducting warrantless searches, Justice Kennedy
asserts that the primary governmental need at play in King is for
correctional personnel and the courts to be able to properly identify
the defendant.409 In his discussion of the importance of
identification, Justice Kennedy writes, “[i]t is a common
occurrence that ‘people detained for minor offenses can turn out to
be the most devious and dangerous criminals.’”410 He then goes on
to point out that police had stopped Timothy McVeigh, serial killer
405. Id. at 1965.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1966–68.
408. See id. at 1977–80 (discussing the government interest in identification,
the reduced privacy of prisoners, and the minimal intrusion of the swab).
409. See id. at 1970 (“The legitimate government interest served by the
Maryland DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law
enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the
persons and possessions they must take into custody.”).
410. Id. at 1971.
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Joel Rifkin, and one of the 9/11 hijackers for traffic violations.411
Here again, Justice Kennedy seems to draw on the audience’s
emotive responses. It would be hard to conjure three more reviled
individuals in the collective awareness of citizens of the United
States than Timothy McVeigh—the Oklahoma City Bomber, a 9/11
hijacker, and Joel Rifkin—a serial killer responsible for the deaths
of at least seventeen women.412 Although these examples are
offered to support the claim that the police simply cannot know
how dangerous the people they detain are, there appears to be the
implication that these traffic stops were missed opportunities to
stop heinous crimes, had police but known. Like Justice Kennedy’s
opening, this reference elicits strong emotions; but they are
emotions that seem beside the Fourth Amendment point at
hand.413
In addressing the Fourth Amendment privacy interest, Justice
Kennedy begins by acknowledging that “[i]t can be agreed that
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in
order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”414 From this point
Justice Kennedy compares the buccal swab to other bodily search
methods including a blood draw, taking of fingernail scrapings,
and conducting a breathalyzer test.415 Based on these points of
comparison he concludes, “the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain
a DNA sample is a minimal one.”416 Comparing the taking of blood,
breath, and fingernail scrapings to an individual’s DNA arguably
411. Id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington,
132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012)).
412. See generally John T. McQuiston, Rifkin, at a Sentencing, Apologizes for
17 Murders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/26/
nyregion/rifkin-at-a-sentencing-apologizes-for-17-murders.html?_r=0
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
413. It could be argued that Justice Kennedy is employing a technique
Aristotle described in The Rhetoric. Under this technique, in instances where an
advocate’s argument is weak, the advocate inflames the audience’s emotions on a
tangential issue from the outset. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 241 (“If you
do not have a reason to give, say not that you are not unaware that what you say
may seem incredible but [that] you are naturally this sort of [virtuous] person and
[that] people never do believe [that] anyone willingly does anything except for
some advantage.”).
414. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013).
415. Id. at 1969.
416. Id. at 1977.
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misses an important emotive component of the issue at hand. It is
well understood today that an individual’s DNA is, in essence,
their blueprint.417 Justice Kennedy misses a powerful emotive
point by focusing on the intrusion caused by the buccal swab rather
than the intrusion caused by the government’s seizure and
retention of an individual’s unique genetic sequence. Justice
Kennedy does tangentially address this issue when explaining that
the statute involved only allows DNA to be retained for
identification purposes.418
2. Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding
The second opinion discussed in this section is Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Safford v. Redding. The Redding case dealt
with a lawsuit brought against the Safford School and several
employees for violating a student’s Fourth Amendment rights.419
Although a majority of the Court ruled that a Fourth Amendment
violation had occurred, Justice Thomas argued one did not.420 The
focus of this discussion is on Justice Thomas’s failure to confront
the powerful emotive roots of the Fourth Amendment that run
counter to his position. Justice Thomas argued at length that
public schools should be declared in loco parentis and thus be freed
of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.421 In this argument
417. See Brief for the Respondent at 45, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958
(2013) (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 315233 (“Our DNA is our blueprint: an individual’s
DNA contains . . . information about the subject’s medical history and genetic
conditions . . . [and] physical and behavioral characteristics, ranging from the
subject's age, ethnicity, and intelligence to the subject's propensity for violence
and addiction.”).
418. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (“The Act also limits the information added
to a DNA database and how it may be used. . . . No purpose other than
identification is permissible[.]”).
419. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009)
(“The issue here is whether a 13-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right was
violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school
officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden
prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”).
420. See id. at 382 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the search of Savana Redding
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
421. Id. at 389.
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he fails to adequately confront the facts of the case at hand and he
fails to explain why the traditionally permissive and discretionary
doctrine of in loco parentis should now be compulsory.
The majority, written by Justice Souter, described the issue
in the case in the following way: “[W]hether a 13-year-old student’s
Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to
a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on
reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription
and over-the-counter drugs to school.”422 The prescription and
over-the-counter drugs in this case were ibuprofen and naproxen,
both of which are anti-inflammatory medications.423
The context of the search in Redding was as follows. School
officials had received reports from students and at least one set of
parents that some students were bringing weapons and
prescription medication into school.424 After receiving the report, a
student went to school officials with a white pill he had gotten from
another student, Marissa Glines.425 The school nurse identified the
pill as a prescription-strength ibuprofen.426 A school official called
Ms. Glines out of class.427 At the same time, school officials
confiscated a daily-planner notebook on Ms. Glines’ desk.428 A
search of the planner revealed several knives, a lighter, and a
cigarette.429 Ms. Glines told school officials that the daily planner
belonged to Ms. Savana Redding, a thirteen-year-old student at the
school.430 Ms. Redding was called to the principal’s office and asked
if the daily planner was hers.431 She said it was, but she had lent
422. Id. at 368 (majority opinion).
423. See id. (“Wilson then showed Savana four white prescription-strength
ibuprofen 400-mg pills, and one over-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all
used for pain and inflammation . . . .”).
424. Id. at 373.
425. See id. at 372 (“On the morning of October 8, the same boy handed Wilson
a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him.”).
426. See id. (“Wilson learned from Peggy Schwallier, the school nurse, that
the pill was Ibuprofen 400 mg, available only by prescription.”).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 368.
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it to a friend and she had no knowledge of the knives, lighter, or
cigarette.432 Ms. Redding’s backpack was searched but nothing was
found.433 Next, she was taken to the school nurse’s office where she
was required to remove her clothes down to her underwear.434 Her
clothes (coat, shirt, pants, and socks) were searched and nothing
was found.435 Next, Ms. Redding was required to “pull her bra out
and to the side and shake it, and to pull the elastic on her
underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some
degree. No pills were found.”436
Ms. Redding’s parents brought suit against the school for a
violation of their daughter’s Fourth Amendment rights.437 At the
trial the school and named defendants brought a summary
judgement motion.438 The District Court granted the motion and
found there had been no Fourth Amendment violation.439 The
ruling was appealed and the Ninth Circuit held the strip search
did violate the Fourth Amendment, but found qualified immunity
should apply to all the named defendants except the assistant
principal of the school who had order the searches be executed.440
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found there had been a
Fourth Amendment violation but qualified immunity was proper
for several defendants.441 Justice Thomas dissented in part.442
At the heart of Justice Thomas’s dissent is the argument that
public schools should be declared in loco parentis, or in the place of
parents, and thus be unconstrained in their ability to conduct
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 369.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. See id. at 369–70 (“The upshot was reversal of summary judgment as to
Wilson, while affirming the judgments in favor of Schwallier, the school nurse,
and Romero, the administrative assistant, since they had not acted as
independent decisionmakers.”).
441. Id. at 379.
442. See generally id. at 382–403 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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searches.443 Justice Thomas, quoting an earlier opinion, explains
that under this doctrine parents delegate authority to schools to
“command obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken
diligence, and to reform bad habits . . . . So empowered,
schoolteachers and administrators had almost complete discretion
to establish and enforce the rules they believed were necessary to
maintain control over the classrooms.”444 At first, this quote seems
like one of those that are common to historical recitations of a
doctrine, but this is not so. Instead Justice Thomas advocates for
“the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of in loco
parentis.”445 In the context of the Redding case he argues “[t]here
can be no doubt that a parent would have had the authority to
conduct the search at issue in this case”446 and if this approach
were adopted “the search of Redding would stand.”447
To support his argument Justice Thomas attempts to paint
two pictures. First, of the case at hand, claiming that school
officials in Redding acted in an “eminently reasonable” way.448
Second, he paints a picture of the public schools in the United
States as out of control.449 The images are meant to establish first
that the school officials in Redding acted reasonably, and second,
that a return to in loco parentis is necessary.
In discussing the facts of the Redding case, Justice Thomas
paints a grim picture of the middle school Ms. Redding attended
and of Ms. Redding herself.450 He notes that school officials were
aware that “a few years ago” a student had obtained a prescription

443. See id. at 383 (“This deep intrusion into the administration of public
schools exemplifies why the Court should return to the common-law doctrine of
in loco parentis . . . .”).
444. Id. at 398 (citations omitted).
445. Id.
446. Id. at 399.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 389.
449. See id. at 383 (“For nearly 25 years this Court has understood that
‘[m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in more recent
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and
violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.’” (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985))).
450. Id. at 386.
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drug from a classmate and become seriously ill.451 As a result the
school had created a strict policy regarding “drugs” in school.452
According to Justice Thomas, this incident “a few years ago”
created a “history of problems with students using and distributing
prohibited and illegal substances on campus.”453 Justice Thomas
also discussed that school officials had found alcohol and cigarettes
in the girl’s bathroom, thus establishing “[t]he school’s substance
abuse problems had not abated by the 2003–2004 school year,
which is when the challenged search of Redding took place.”454
Turning next to Ms. Redding, Justice Thomas noted that school
officials had “smelled alcohol” on her in the past, that she was
alleged to have hosted a party where alcohol was served, and that
she was suspected of being among a group of students “planning
on taking the pills after lunch.”455 In his discussion of the ibuprofen
in this case Justice Thomas refers to it as “pills,” “drugs,” and
“prescription pills.”456
Although it seems this portrayal is meant to conjure a fearful
image, because of its heavy-handedness, it comes across more
comic than dire. At one point, Justice Thomas attempts to confront
the obvious question of the triviality of the drugs in question. He
concedes “[a]dmittedly, the Ibuprofen and Naproxen at issue in
this case are not the prescription painkillers at the forefront of the
prescription-drug-abuse problem.”457 However, from there he notes
that it is possible to overdose on anti-inflammatory pills and people
have been known to have allergic reactions to such medicines.458
Rather than confronting the central question, whether school
officials overreacted in conducting the search, Justice Thomas
seems to argue that it was not an overreaction because ibuprofen
451. Id. at 385.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 386.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 396.
458. See id. at 396–97 (“As nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs),
they pose a risk of death from overdose . . . . Moreover, the side-effects caused by
the use of NSAIDs can be magnified if they are taken in combination with other
drugs.”).
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can kill.459 Again, the emotive effect of this discussion is not to
create concern or empathy for school officials, but to make Justice
Thomas seem out of touch.
Justice Thomas concludes his discussion on the specifics of the
Redding case with the statement:
In determining whether the search’s scope was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, it is therefore irrelevant
whether the officials suspected Redding of possessing
prescription-strength Ibuprofen, nonprescription-strength
Naproxen, or some harder street drug . . . . Reasonable
suspicion that Redding was in possession of drugs in violation
of [school] . . . policies, therefore, justified a search extending to
any area where small pills could be concealed.460

This conclusion begs many questions. First, the categorical claim
that the item a student possesses that is against school policy plays
no part in a reasonableness analysis seems, well, unreasonable.
Second, Justice Thomas seems to authorize a more invasive search
than the one conducted in the case. After all, small pills can be
hidden in body cavities.
The image Justice Thomas paints of public schools in the
United States compared to the days of old is also noteworthy.
Citing numerous earlier Supreme Court decisions, Justice Thomas
continues the Court’s tradition of declaring public schools out of
control. Citing Court cases from 1975 and 1996, Justice Thomas
writes “[f]or nearly 25 years this Court has understood,
‘maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in
more recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly
ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become
major social problems.”461 He goes on to quote studies that
“[t]eenage abuse of over-the-counter and prescription drugs poses
459. See id. at 397
If a student with a previously unknown intolerance to Ibuprofen or
Naproxen were to take either drug and become ill, the public outrage
would likely be directed toward the school for failing to take steps to
prevent the unmonitored use of the drug. In light of the risks involved,
a school’s decision to establish and enforce a school prohibition on the
possession of any unauthorized drug is thus a reasonable judgment.
460. Id. at 397–98.
461. Id. at 383.
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an increasingly alarming national crisis”462 and “44 percent of
teens sa[id] drugs are used, kept or sold on grounds of their
school.”463 Justice Thomas goes on, stating “[t]eenagers are
nevertheless apt to ‘believe the myth that these [prescription]
drugs provide a medically safe high’”464 and that “prescription
drugs have become ‘gateway drugs to other substances of
abuse.’”465
Although it cannot be denied that the public schools in the
United States face a drug problem, once again Justice Thomas is
too heavy-handed in his emotional appeal; especially given the
drugs that were the subject of the case and the fact that the school
was a middle school.466 The image Justice Thomas paints plays out
like a combination of the Black Board Jungle467 and Stand and
Deliver.468 A reader is left to imagine drug deals being conducted
in hallways, classrooms, and bathrooms. Further, no effort was
made to distinguish between the problems of the nation’s high
schools and middle schools. Based on Justice Thomas’s broad
descriptions it would appear drug use is rampant from K–12.
Justice Thomas finishes this discussion with a final, misaimed
emotional appeal, “[b]y declaring the search unreasonable in this
case, the majority has ‘surrender[ed] control of the American
public school system to public school students.’”469
As mentioned above, Justice Thomas’s solution to this problem
is to have “the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of
462.
463.
464.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. (quoting OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, TEENS AND
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS ON THE EMERGING DRUG
THREAT 3 (2007), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED495769.pdf).
465. Id. at 396 (quoting THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, UNDER THE COUNTER: THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE
OF
CONTROLLED
PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS
IN
THE
U.S.
4
(2005),
https://www.centeronaddiction.org/sites/default/files/Under-the-counter-the-diversionand-abuse-of-controlled-prescription-drugs-in-the-us_0.pdf).
466. See id. at 385 (“In this instance, the suspicion of drug possession arose
at a middle school . . . .”).
467. BLACKBOARD JUNGLE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1955).
468. STAND AND DELIVER (Warner Bros. 1988).
469. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 398 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in loco parentis.”470 According to Justice Thomas, such authority
would permit school officials to “command obedience, to control
stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits.”471
Despite seeming to place far too rosy an outlook on the results of a
return to in loco parentis, Justice Thomas’s view of how the
doctrine would be employed is not entirely clear. In loco parentis
was a permissive doctrine, which is to say the doctrine “assumes a
voluntary delegation of parental authority.”472 Thus, the doctrine
was not fashioned for a system of “compulsory education.”473
Further, as some of the sources Justice Thomas cites note, under
the doctrine a parent “may also delegate part of his parental
authority.”474 This seems to say that each parent in a school could
choose a different level of delegation—one parent might say you
can search my child’s belongings but not her clothes, while another
would say you can search as you please. But this is clearly not what
Justice Thomas has in mind. Based on his opinion, Justice Thomas
envisions the rule applying to all students unless parents, through
their local school board, change the policy.475 Quoting an earlier
concurrence of his own, Justice Thomas writes, “[i]f parents do not
like the rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in
school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to
private schools or home school them; or they can simply move.”476
Emotively, this statement reads quite poorly. It has the ring of
someone who does not care or someone who does not understand.
Thus, Justice Thomas appears like Dickens’ Ebenezer Scrooge
turning away gentlemen collecting for charities, “are there no work
houses, are there no prisons?”477 Or like Marie Antoinette
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Susan Stewart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused,
and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (2010).
473. Id. at 991.
474. Redding, 557 U.S. at 399 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (internal citation omitted).
475. Id. at 400.
476. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
477. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 12 (1843). When the men point
out to Scrooge that most poor people would rather die than go to a workhouse or
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suggesting that if the peasants of France had no bread the crown
should “let them eat cake.”478 Beyond the immediate emotive
problem with the statement, it would have the practical effect of
granting greater Fourth Amendment protection to those who can
send their children to private school or homeschool than those who
cannot.
Although Justice Thomas’s concern for limiting the options
available for schools to combat drugs and indiscipline in the
classroom is a long recognized concern of the Supreme Court,479 the
Redding case was a poor vehicle for his argument. Justice Thomas
appears to have missed the powerful emotions directly connected
with the Fourth Amendment that are active in this case. In broad
strokes, middle school officials conducted a strip search of a
thirteen-year-old girl to find anti-inflammatory medication.480
Justice Thomas’s efforts to justify these actions at once seemed out
of touch with the essence of the Fourth Amendment while also
seeming out of touch with the limited options many parents have
with regard to their children’s education.
3. Samson v. California
The third opinion dealing with pathos is Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Samson v. California.481 The Samson case dealt with the
warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee under California
law.482 The majority in Samson found that “a condition of release
can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable
expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law
enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.”483
prison, Scrooge states “then let them do so and decrease the surplus population.”
478. See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED
FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 253 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (stating
that the author of the exact quote is unknown, but it is commonly attributed to
Marie Antoinette).
479. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 385–87 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
480. Id. at 374 (majority opinion).
481. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
482. Id. at 846–47.
483. Id. at 847.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented.484
Justice Stevens’s dissent is strongly emotive, drawing from a wide
range of Fourth Amendment cases,485 but failing to confront the
core legal and emotive question posed by the facts of the case.
In Samson, the defendant was on parole from a conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm.486 On September 6, 2002,
an officer recognized Mr. Samson and knew he was on parole.487
The officer suspected that Mr. Samson was in violation of his
parole.488 He stopped Mr. Samson and asked him if he was current
with his parole officer.489 Mr. Samson said he was, and the officer
verified that Mr. Samson was telling the truth.490 At this point the
officer conducted a search of Mr. Samson and found a small
quantity of methamphetamine.491 Mr. Samson brought a motion to
suppress the evidence based on a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.492 The government countered that the search was
permissible under California law, which required a parolee to
agree in writing to submit to a search anytime and anywhere as a
condition of release.493 The motion was denied and Mr. Samson was
convicted.494 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
case.495 A majority of the Court affirmed the California court’s
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated.496
Justice Stevens’s dissent claimed that the majority opinion
“sanctions . . . an unprecedented curtailment of liberty.”497 At the
484. Id. at 857.
485. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (concluding that
suspicionless searches are the very evil the Fourth Amendment prevents).
486. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 847.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 846.
494. Id. at 847.
495. Id. at 846.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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heart of his opinion is the belief that the majority opinion is
opening the door to arbitrary suspicionless searches and that “is
the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp
out.”498 Justice Stevens argues at length that the Court’s precedent
dealing with parolees and the Fourth Amendment has never
sanctioned suspicionless searches.499 In describing the majority’s
decision, he repeatedly calls it “unprecedented” and accuses the
majority of engaging in reasoning that is “entirely circular.”500
Justice Stevens concludes with the statement that “[t]he
requirement of individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the
shield the Framers selected to guard against the evils of arbitrary
action, caprice, and harassment. To say that those evils may be
averted without that shield is, . . . to pay lip service to the end
while withdrawing the means.”501
Justice Stevens argues effectively and passionately against
the majority opinion, but fails to address the strongest emotive
component against his position. The California penal code section
at issue in the case requires, as a condition of parole, parolees to
“agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole
officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or
night, . . . with or without a search warrant and with or without
cause.”502 Thus, an inmate is faced with a choice: Agree to
suspicionless searches anytime, anywhere, or stay in jail.
Justice Stevens gives this issue a glancing blow when he
claims that the State of California cannot reduce a parolee’s
legitimate expectations of privacy simply by announcing that
parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy.503 Justice
Stevens claims that this would be as if “the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry.”504 But is it
really the same? Or put more specifically: Is it emotively the same?
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

Id. at 858.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 857, 863.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 843 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000)).
Id. at 861.
Id. at 863 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979)).
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Mr. Samson was in jail for a crime involving a handgun.505 He was
given a choice regarding his confinement.506 He could serve the
remainder of his prison term in confinement or he could accept
parole with the caveat that he would have to submit to searches
without limitations.507 This scenario is quite distinct from the
government announcing that homes are no longer private.
One of the challenges for the dissent in Samson was that the
majority did not rely on the consent doctrine to uphold the
search.508 Thus, the emotively strongest argument in favor of the
search was not exactly in play. This fact seems to have made it
more difficult for Justice Stevens to confront the emotively weak
element of his position. Nonetheless, confronting that weakness
was necessary to give the other aspects of his dissent traction.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens draws on many of the powerful
pathos-based components of the Fourth Amendment. He discussed
the Amendment’s primary purpose of preventing the arbitrary
execution of government powers through general warrants, the
specter of the government shrinking privacy through
declaration.509 However, in order for these emotional themes to
gain momentum, the strongest emotional argument in favor of the
government’s position must be confronted, even if not relied upon
by the majority.
C. Logos
From the classical era to modern times, rhetoricians have
argued that logos, or appeals to reason and logic, are likely the
most important of the modes of persuasion.510 In the influential
505. Id. at 846 (majority opinion).
506. Id. at 851.
507. Id.
508. See id. at 852 n.3 (“Because we find that the search at issue here is
reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach
the issue whether ‘acceptance of the search condition constituted consent . . . .’”).
509. See id. at 862 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In any event, the notion that a
parolee legitimately expects only so much privacy as a prisoner is utterly without
foundation.”).
510. See generally Edward M. Cope, Introduction to ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC
WITH ANALYSIS NOTES AND APPENDICES 99 (1867); HERRICK, supra note 42, at 21;
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modern work on rhetoric by Ch. Perelman and L. OlbrechtsTyteca, The New Rhetoric, the authors noted the “prestige of logical
thought”511 and how such arguments can give the advocate the
appearance of “rigorous thought.”512 Logic-based arguments are
particularly appropriate to our common perception of “justice” in
the United States. As discussed above, our symbols of justice,
scales, blindfolded figures and grave unemotional judges dressed
in black, convey the common image of judicial decision making as
an objective, logically intensive event.513 The arguments contained
in the opinions of Supreme Court Justices are replete with
references to logic and syllogism.514
CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC 193–95 (1st ed. 1969)
(discussing the power of quasi-logical arguments as distinguished from
formal/mathematical argumentation).
511. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 194.
512. Id.
513. Supra note 389 and accompanying text.
514. Listed below are three examples from Fourth Amendment cases where
Justices made express use of syllogisms in arguing their positions. The frequency
with which Justices more broadly reference “logic” is much greater than the more
technical term “syllogism.” The first is Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
At the heart of the majority’s opinion in this case is the following
syllogism: (1) the rule excluding in federal criminal trials evidence
which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is “part and parcel”
of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Wolf held that the “privacy” assured
against federal action by the Fourth Amendment is also protected
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) it is
therefore “logically and constitutionally necessary” that the Weeks
exclusionary rule should also be enforced against the States.
The second is Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
On this premise of the changed command of the amendment, the Court’s task in
passing on the use of eavesdropping evidence becomes a simple one. Its syllogism
is this:
The Fourth Amendment forbids invasion of privacy and excludes
evidence such invasion obtains; To listen secretly to a man's
conversations or to tap his telephone conversations invades his
privacy; Therefore, the Fourth Amendment bars use of evidence
eavesdropping or by tapping telephone wires.
The foregoing syllogism is faulty for at least two reasons: (1) the Fourth
Amendment itself contains no provision that implies a purpose to bar
evidence or anything else an “unreasonable search or seizure” secures;
(2) the Fourth Amendment's language, fairly construed, refers
specifically to “unreasonable searches and seizures” and not to a broad
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Although the importance of logical reasoning is at once
obvious, it is also controversial. Much of the legal realism
movement can be seen as a challenge to the primacy of logic as a
way of judicial decision making.515 Despite the tension between
logical analysis and the practicalities/realities of human decision
making, at least the appearance of logic is critical. In this section,
I seek to discuss opinions where the internal logic of the Justice’s
opinion seems weak. This is distinct from when a Justice has relied
on a precedent that does not support or weakly supports their
position.
Below I discuss three opinions where the Justice’s opinion
demonstrates internally weak logic. The opinions contain a variety
of potential informal logical fallacies. These fallacies include: the
hasty generalization;516 arguing from consequences,517 the fallacy

undefined right to “privacy” in general.
The third is Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 861 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Court is able to make this unprecedented move only by making
another.
Coupling the dubious holding of Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104
S. Ct. 3194 (1984), with the bald statement that parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, the Court two-steps its way
through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the application of Fourth
Amendment principles altogether. The logic, apparently, is this:
Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like
prisoners; therefore, parolees have no legitimate expectation of
privacy.
515. See Daniel Z. Epstein, Rationality, Legitimacy, and the Law, 7 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (discussing the foundational challenge posed by the
American legal realism movement).
516. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 195 (explaining the fallacy of the hasty
generalization is “[a]lso called the fallacy of selected instances, it results from
enumerating instances without obtaining a representative number to establish
an inductive generalization”).
517. DOUGLAS WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 27 (2008).
Walton notes that arguing from consequences may be valid in some
circumstances, if the consequences are not relevant to the issue being discussed
it is fallacious. Id. For example, an attorney who argues that you cannot find a
defendant not guilty because it will cause wide spread rioting is arguing from
consequences.
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of composition;518 and the fallacy of the non sequitur.519 The first is
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Missouri v. McNeely.520 The
McNeely case dealt with the exigent circumstances surrounding
the taking of a blood sample from a suspected drunk driver.521 The
second is Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Navarette v.
California.522 Navarette addressed the minimum requirements
necessary to conduct a reasonable suspicion detention based on an
anonymous tip.523 The third opinion is Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Arizona v. Gant.524 The Gant case addressed a search incident to
an arrest that occurs in an automobile.525
1. Missouri v. McNeely
In Missouri v. McNeely,526 the Court was asked to resolve
“whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream
presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood
testing in all drunk-driving cases.”527 In McNeely, a police officer
observed the defendant driving erratically and speeding.528 After
McNeely was stopped, the officer noticed McNeely’s eyes were
bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he smelled of alcohol.529
McNeely admitted to drinking alcohol that night and after failing

518. See id. at 221 (“The fallacy of composition consists of reasoning
improperly from a property of a member of a group to a property of the group
itself.” (quoting JOSEPH GERARD BRENNAN, A HANJDBOOK OF LOGIC 190 (1957))).
519. See id. at 203 (noting the non sequitur “is an argument that contains a
conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the premises or any antecedent
statement”).
520. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
521. Id. at 1556.
522. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
523. Id. at 1687.
524. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
525. Id. at 332.
526. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
527. Id. at 1556.
528. Id.
529. Id.
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a field sobriety test, he refused a breathalyzer test.530 The officer
then took McNeely to the hospital and asked if he would submit to
a blood test, which McNeely refused.531 The officer had a blood test
done nonetheless.532 The blood test determined that the
Defendant’s blood alcohol level was .154, far above Missouri’s .08
legal limit.533 The officer charged McNeely with drunk driving and
at trial, McNeely moved to suppress the blood test.534
The trial court suppressed the blood test results and the
government appealed the decision.535 The case was directed to the
Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court’s holding,
stating this was “unquestionably a routine DWI case”536 that did
not merit the application of the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement.537 The case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court.538
Justice Sotomayor, writing for a majority of the Court, only
answered the question presented of whether in drunk driving cases
a per se rule on warrantless blood testing was justified.539 In
rejecting the proposed per se rule, Justice Sotomayor explained
that despite the fact that in DUI cases, evidence of the crime, in
the form of alcohol in the blood stream, is being destroyed as it is
metabolized, the usual requirement of a totality of the
circumstances analysis to determine exigencies would still be
required.540
Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part and Justice Thomas wrote a dissent.541 Justice
530. Id. at 1557.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 1556.
538. Id. at 1558.
539. Id. at 1556.
540. Id. at 1568.
541. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that Justices Breyer and Alito
joined. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was not joined by anyone. Id. at
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Thomas suggested that the proposed per se rule in DUI cases
should be adopted.542 Chief Justice Roberts suggested a rule that
in effect split the difference between the majority’s rule and Justice
Thomas’s opinion.543
Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with a definitive
statement that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s opinion would
have no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of
him, once he decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving
suspect who has refused a breathalyzer test.”544 He then proceeded
to argue that the proper method of solving the controversy in the
case would be to create what Justice Sotomayor described as “a
modified per se rule.”545 Under this modified rule an officer would
be required to seek a warrant if there is “time to secure a warrant
before blood can be drawn.”546 If not, “the exigent circumstances
exception applies by its terms, and the blood may be drawn without
a warrant.”547 Thus, under the Chief Justice’s proposed rule, police
would be expected to pursue a warrant during the time it takes
them to get a suspect from a traffic stop to a hospital. After that,
the per se rule would apply and the blood could be drawn without
a warrant.548
Contained in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent are at least two
logically questionable positions. First, that police officers will have
“no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of
him”549 based on the majority opinion. Second, that based on the
body’s natural metabolism of alcohol in the blood, exigent
circumstances should be presumed in all DUI cases.550
1574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
542. Id. at 1579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
543. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
544. Id.
545. Id. at 1563 (majority opinion).
546. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
547. Id.
548. See id. at 1563 (majority opinion) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion would create a per se rule “under which a warrantless blood draw is
permissible if the officer could not secure a warrant . . . in the time it takes to
transport the suspect to a hospital or similar facility”).
549. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
550. Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opening line to his dissent is clearly
intended to make a powerful emotive point. This is manifested in
its directness and in the deliberate choice to repeat the words “no
idea”.551 It is more than simply a pathos-based argument, it is, in
effect, the conclusion to the syllogism of his argument. If we were
to put the argument into syllogistic form (or more accurately in
enthymeme form) it might look like this: Officers confronted with
a DUI suspect who refuses a breathalyzer require clear guidance
or they will have no idea of how to determine when they have
adequate exigencies to permit a warrantless blood draw. The
majority’s totality of the circumstances test does not provide clear
guidance. Thus, the majority’s totality of the circumstances test
leaves officers with no idea how to determine when they have
adequate exigencies to permit a warrantless blood draw. But can
this be true? And if it is true, is there not a larger problem? If the
totality of the circumstances test does not work for the exigencies
of a DUI case, why should it be adequate in any other exigent
circumstances situation?
Chief Justice Roberts is arguably engaging in a fallacy of
distraction—such fallacies divert the central argument from the
issue at hand to the irrelevant, irrational, or emotional.552 In this
case, Chief Justice Roberts is deploying a variant on the fallacy of
terror.553 Such an argument suggests that if the course proposed
by the opposing view is taken, disaster will ensue. Here the Chief
Justice paints a picture of police officers lost in a sea of indecision,
with “no idea, no idea” how to proceed.
It could also be argued that the Chief Justice has made a hasty
generalization. Perhaps in some circumstances an officer would
feel he or she has “no idea” how they should proceed in a DUI case
involving a refusal to take a breathalyzer based on the totality of
the circumstances, but this would seem the exception. The fallacy

551. Id.
552. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 174 (explaining that the fallacy of
distraction includes those that “shift attention from reasoned argument to other
things that are always irrelevant, always irrational, and often emotional”).
553. See id. at 188 (explaining that the fallacy of terror “makes an appeal to
fear of exaggerated consequences in the event an adversary's argument prevails”).
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of a hasty generalization occurs when an advocate moves too
quickly from a specific example to a general conclusion.554
Contrary to the Chief Justice’s argument, there are many
cases involving exigent circumstances and the totality of the
circumstances test that provide clarity for officers regarding DUI
refusal cases.555 The entire body of exigent circumstances cases
paints a picture of when an officer can pursue a warrantless blood
draw.556 First, the officer must have probable cause.557 Second, “the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”558
Several Supreme Court cases have addressed the exigencies
created by the danger of imminent destruction of evidence.559
These cases seem explicit, requiring police to secure a warrant
unless they “are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’
situation.”560
554. Id. at 195.
555. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“We
cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made [the search] imperative.”); see also Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (stating that the natural dissipation of alcohol could be an
exigent circumstance when combined with other factors); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (concluding the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence).
556. See cases cited supra note 555 (reiterating that the court must consider
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a delay to obtain a
warrant would be detrimental).
557. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 768 n.12 (1966); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 210, at 179–82.
558. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
559. See id. at 463 (stating warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of
evidence is allowed); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769 (explaining an officer’s fear in
the delay for a warrant leading to the destruction of evidence); see also McDonald,
335 U.S. at 455 (“No reason, except inconvenience of the officers and delay in
preparing papers and getting before a magistrate, appears for the failure to seek
a search warrant.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (determining
that there was no evidence under the threat of destruction). For a more complete
discussion of the early history of the exigent circumstances exception applied to
the destruction of evidence, see generally Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency
and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need
for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1988).
560. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013); see also Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (“Where there are exigent circumstances in
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The second potential logical flaw in Chief Justice Roberts’s
dissent is that the natural metabolic process creates, in effect,
exigent circumstances in every DUI refusal case. As the Chief
Justice rightly points out, the exigent circumstances exception
may apply when “there is a compelling need to prevent the
imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time
to obtain a warrant.”561 Again, placing this argument in syllogistic
form it might be the following: Exigent circumstances exist when
there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of
any important evidence and no time to obtain a warrant; in all DUI
breathalyzer refusal cases once a suspect is transported to a
facility to draw blood there is a compelling need to prevent the
imminent destruction of important evidence; thus there are
exigent circumstances in every DUI breathalyzer refusal case once
the suspect has been transported to a medical facility. This
argument can be challenged based on its use of the term imminent.
In cases involving exigent circumstances based on destruction
of evidence like Ker v. California,562 or Kentucky v. King,563 there
is a focus on the speed and ease with which evidence can be
destroyed. In a typical drug case, the evidence of criminal activity
is capable of being quickly and easily destroyed. The capacity to
quickly and easily destroy evidence is not present in most DUI
breathalyzer refusal cases.564 Individuals suspected of being
intoxicated cannot choose to destroy the evidence immediately.
According to the statistics the majority uses and dissenting
opinions, the most rapid rate at which the body metabolizes alcohol
is .025 per hour.565 The legal limit for all states is .08.566 Based on
which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of a
crime, it is reasonable to permit the action withou[sic] prior judicial evaluation.”).
561. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
562. 374 U.S. 23 (1960).
563. 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
564. See id. at 466 (stating that officers are required to make split-second
judgments and in this case, occupants were moving around in a room filled with
evidence).
565. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560; id. at 1570 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
566. Id. at 1571 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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these facts, the fastest an individual arrested for a DUI could
metabolize all of the alcohol in their system would be more than
three hours. Under the facts in McNeely, the defendant’s BAC was
.154 at the time of his warrantless blood draw.567 Based on
McNeely’s BAC, the soonest the alcohol would have been out of his
blood stream is over six hours after the blood test.
Chief Justice Roberts addresses the argument that experts
can present a regression analysis to a jury to explain how high a
defendant’s BAC was at the time of arrest, as opposed to when the
blood was drawn.568 In a footnote the Chief Justice asserts such
“second-best evidence may prove useless . . . defense attorneys
have objected to that evidence, courts have at times rejected it, and
juries may be suspicious of it.”569 This is a weak counter. Defense
attorneys regularly object to every test that would prove their
client guilty and courts have at times rejected all sorts of tests. All
the Justices on the Court have accepted the science surrounding
how alcohol is metabolized and the range of rates at which it is
metabolized.570 Why should we expect less of jurors?
The logical premise of this second argument can be challenged
as incorrectly categorizing all DUI breathalyzer refusal cases as
involving the imminent destruction of evidence. The facts are
arguably to the contrary. In the average DUI case, the evidence is
preserved, at least for a predictable term of hours.
2. Navarette v. California
The second opinion in this section is Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion in Navarette. In the opinion, Justice Thomas addressed the
standard for permitting a traffic stop based on reasonable
suspicion supplied by an anonymous informant.571 The focus of this
discussion will be on Justice Thomas’s conclusion that the
anonymous tip in the case from a motorist claiming to have been
567. Id. at 1557 (majority opinion).
568. Id. at 1572 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
569. Id. at 1572 n.1.
570. Id. at 1559 (majority opinion); id. at 1570–71 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
571. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).

1956

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869 (2016)

forced off the road by a particular truck provided reasonable
suspicion to believe a crime was currently ongoing.572 Justice
Thomas’s opinion illustrates the fallacy of composition.573 This
fallacy is described in Joseph Gerald Brennan’s book A Handbook
of Logic,574 as “consist[ing] of reasoning improperly from a property
of a member of a group to a property of the group itself.”575
In Navarette, police received a 911 call from a motorist
claiming to have been run off the road by another vehicle.576 The
caller gave a detailed description of the car, its license plate
number, location, and direction.577 Approximately thirteen
minutes after the 911 call, a police cruiser spotted a car fitting the
description and followed the car for five minutes, ultimately
pulling it over.578 As the officers approached the vehicle they
smelled marijuana, and a subsequent search revealed thirty
pounds of the drug.579 At trial, the defendants moved to suppress
the marijuana based on an illegal stop.580 Specifically, the
defendants argued that the anonymous caller did not provide an
adequate basis to establish reasonable suspicion.581 The trial court
denied the motion, as did the California Court of Appeals.582 The
California Supreme Court refused to hear the case and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.583 Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority, affirmed the lower court rulings.584
In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas relies on a number of
inferences to arrive at his conclusion.585 One inference in particular
572. Id. at 1692.
573. See id. at 1691 (relying on inferences related to reckless driving that the
defendant must have been drunk).
574. JOSEPH GERARD BRENNAN, A HANDBOOK OF LOGIC (1957).
575. Id. at 190.
576. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
577. Id. at 1687.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 1692.
585. See id. at 1690 (concluding that the report of the witness in this case was
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could be challenged, both from a logical perspective and because of
the implications it signals for reasonable suspicion standards.
That inference is Justice Thomas’s conclusion that an allegation by
one motorist that another motorist “ran them off the road” provides
an adequate factual basis for a police stop based on reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving.586
As Justice Thomas rightly discusses, in order for an officer to
have the authority to stop a vehicle based on a reliable tip, there
must be “reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be
afoot.’”587 In Navarette, the anonymous tip was that the
defendant’s vehicle ran the reporting party off the road.588 Based
on that information alone, Justice Thomas concluded that
reasonable suspicion existed that the driver of the vehicle
described by the tipster was drunk.589 Once again, to place Justice
Thomas’s reasoning in logical form: All vehicles that run other
vehicles off the road provide adequate articulable facts to
reasonably suspect the driver of the vehicle is intoxicated; the
driver in Navarette allegedly ran the tipster off the road; thus
reasonable suspicion existed to stop the defendants.
The difficulty with the above syllogism is that it appears to
assume too much in the major premise. As mentioned above, the
fallacy of composition occurs when too much is assumed about the
whole of a group based on a characteristic of a member of the
group.590 This could also be described as a fallacy of hasty
generalization—where a generalization is arrived at too quickly
based on too few specific examples. In Navarette, the group or
whole would be all those who drive in such a way as to run another
reliable because the reporter called 911, and because her report was allegedly
made shortly after the incident she was reporting). But see id. at 1694 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (challenging the majority’s conclusions).
586. See id. at 1690 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that the behavior alleged
by the 911 caller, ‘viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion’ of drunk driving.” (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996))).
587. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
588. Id. at 1687.
589. Id. at 1690–91.
590. See ALDISERT, supra note 7, at 221 (explaining the fallacy of composition
as misapplying the tendency of a member of a group to the tendency of the group
generally).
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driver off the road. Some members of that group could be distracted
drivers, texting or reading emails; some could be overly tired and
falling asleep at the wheel; some could be angry drivers, purposely
driving another person off the road due to a perceived slight; some
could be intoxicated; and some could have just made an honest
mistake and accidentally run another motorist off the road. Justice
Thomas’s logical error is compounded when the other facts of
Navarette are considered. Although briefly mentioned in the the
majority opinion, the dissent focused on the fact that after police
encountered the defendant’s truck, they followed the vehicle for
five minutes.591 During the five-minute pursuit the vehicle did not
do anything suspicious.592 These facts make the likelihood of drunk
driving even less than one of the other possible explanations.593
The standard of reasonable suspicion has always been difficult
to quantify. It is something less than probable cause but more than
“a mere ‘hunch.’”594 However, it has always required a
connection.595 This is categorically distinct from the standard
Justice Thomas provides in Navarette. Even if the standard was as
low as a mere hunch, that hunch would need more than mere
possibility: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
describes a hunch as “a strong intuitive feeling.”596 There are no
facts in Navarette to support even an intuitive feeling that the
defendants in the case were drunk as opposed to any other reason
for running another vehicle off the road.597 In fact, the code that
was broadcast to the responding police officers was not for drunk
591. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1696 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
592. Id.
593. See id. (“Consequently, the tip’s suggestion of ongoing drunken driving
(if it could be deemed to suggest that) not only went uncorroborated; it was
affirmatively undermined.”).
594. Id. at 1687 (majority opinion) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
595. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (describing the amount and
veracity of information required to justify reasonable suspicion).
596. Hunch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1102 (1981).
597. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1695 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the anonymous caller never made an accusation of drunk
driving, and that saying she was “[run] off the roadway” neither “assert[ed] that
the driver was drunk nor even raise[d] the likelihood that the driver was drunk”).
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driving, but reckless driving.598 Thus, Justice Thomas’s reasoning
fails because the major premise he relies on is faulty.
The standard of reasonable suspicion has been criticized as
having steadily moved more and more in favor of law enforcement
interests since Terry v. Ohio,599 but Justice Thomas’s formulation
is a new leap further in that direction.600 When the facts in Terry
that provided reasonable suspicion are compared to the facts in
Navarette, it can hardly be said that the Navarette majority is
applying the same test as that which the majority applied in
Terry.601 In Terry v. Ohio, the officer observed two men repeatedly
walk past the front of a store, look in the window, walk further
down the street and then return, once again looking in the window
of the same store.602 This happened approximately a dozen times
in the course of ten to twelve minutes.603 The officer, suspicious
that the men were reconnoitering the store for a robbery, stopped
the men.604 In Terry, there was a clear connection between the
598. Joint Appendix at 20–31, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014)
(No. 12-9490) 2013 WL 6115701. The 911 operator in the case stated, “I
broadcasted it to the coastal units. So I would say, Attention, costal units. BOL
for—well, in this case it was a reckless driver, 23103. And then give the
information, the silver, the F150 pickup, etc.” Also, the responding officer
acknowledged receiving the message regarding reckless driving, “I remember
hearing dispatch of a reckless driver southbound on Highway 1. I don’t recall the
exact location. It was at the north end of the area that I was supposed to cover
and basically coming toward Fort Bragg.” Id. at 46.
599. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
600. See David Cashman, Comment, Criminal Law—Terry Searches
Predicated on Nothing More Than Reasonable Suspicion that a Suspect is Armed
and Dangerous—United States v. House, 463 F. App’x 783 (10th Cir. 2012), 18
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 151, 165 (2013) (“[S]ince Terry, courts have
allowed officers ever more leeway . . . , often at the expense of the privacy rights
of those being investigated . . . . [S]ubsequent [court] decisions have moved the
law on stop and frisks steadily in the government’s favor.”).
601. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 8 (determining that there was reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity where the officer personally witnessed behavior
indicative of a “stake-out” over the course of a ten to twelve minute period), with
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (determining that there was reasonable suspicion of
drunk driving where the officers were responding to an anonymous tip of reckless
driving and had not personally witnessed any behavior indicative of drunk or
reckless driving over the course of a five minute period).
602. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 6–7.
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behavior the officer observed and the criminal activity he
suspected was still afoot.
In Navarette, the criminal activity that was actually suspected
had already been completed, reckless driving.605 If the officers had
observed behavior that made them suspect the defendants were
continuing to engage in reckless driving, or if they observed
additional facts that connected the alleged incident the tipster
described to drunk driving, then reasonable suspicion would
exist.606 Even the examples Justice Thomas provided of past cases
where courts have found reasonable suspicion to believe drunk
driving was occurring provide more information than that in
Navarette, such as “crossing over the center line on the highway
and almost causing several head-on collisions,”607 “‘driving all over
the road’ and ‘weaving back and forth,’”608 and “driving in the
median.”609 Compare this to the bare assertion in Navarette that
the defendants’ car ran another car off the road.
Justice Thomas’s formulation in Navarette can be challenged
as including an overly broad major premise and thereby expanding
the Terry stop exception.610 By equating factual conduct that could
possibly be explained by criminal activity being afoot—rather than
requiring the factual activity to create a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity—Justice Thomas has converted the reasonable
suspicion test into a “reasonable possibility” test.

605. See supra note 601 and accompanying text (explaining that the nature of
the initial report was one of reckless driving, not drunk driving).
606. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1699 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a single traffic law,
they would have had cause to stop the truck . . . .”).
607. Id. at 1690 (majority opinion) (quoting State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714,
715–16 (Haw. 2004)).
608. Id. at 1690–91 (quoting State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 361 (N.J. 2003)).
609. Id. at 1691 (quoting State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001)).
610. See id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that an anonymous tip
was enough to “counsel observation of the truck to see if it was driven by a
drunken driver,” but not enough to justify a Terry stop).
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3. Arizona v. Gant
The final opinion discussed in this section is also the shortest.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Arizona v. Gant is a mere few hundred
words, yet those few words underlie a question that stands at the
crossroad of logic and judicial philosophy. The question raised in
Gant is whether the doctrine of stare decisis can exceed the plain
language of the Constitution.611
In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court took up once again the
scope of searches incident to arrest when the arrest is associated
with a suspect in an automobile.612 The question of what impact, if
any, the fact that an individual is in, or was moments before in, a
vehicle has occupied several Supreme Court decisions.613 Prior to
Gant, most courts believed that once an individual was arrested,
the entirety of the passenger compartment of the vehicle could be
searched.614 Some argued this rule was logically at odds with the
precedent that gave rise to the rule and the basic requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.615 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, asserted that any conclusion that arresting the recent
occupant of an automobile always gave police the right to search
the vehicle without a warrant was incorrect.616 Justice Stevens
then explained the proper application of the Court’s precedent was
611. Compare Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (“We have never
relied
on
stare
decisis
to
justify
the
continuance
of
an
unconstitutional . . . practice.”), with id. at 354–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Principles of stare decisis must apply, and those who wish this Court to change
a well-established legal precedent—where, as here, there has been considerable
reliance on the legal rule in question—bear a heavy burden.”).
612. Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
613. See generally Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
614. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 342–43 (highlighting that lower court decisions
trend toward treating the search of a vehicle incident to arrest as “a police
entitlement rather than as an exception” to the rule (citing Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004))).
615. See id. at 342 n.2 (referencing United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2001); and United
States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987) as cases challenging a broad
interpretation of Belton).
616. Id. at 343.
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“[u]nder our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct
a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of
the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.”617
Justice Breyer dissented from the majority.618 The primary
basis for his objection was that the majority appeared to be
breaking from the doctrine of stare decisis without an adequate
foundation.619 Of particular significance to this discussion is
Justice Breyer’s statement that “I . . . agree with Justice
Stevens, . . . that the rule can produce results divorced from its
underlying Fourth Amendment rationale.”620 Despite this
statement, Justice Breyer asserts that because this is not a case of
first impression, the doctrine of stare decisis should carry the
day.621
Justice Breyer’s short dissent is logically sound provided that
he believes that stare decisis can trump the importance of fulfilling
the rationale that gave birth to a line of constitutional precedent.
Under this argument, fulfilling the objectives of clarity and
stability could, in some circumstances, exceed a rationale that
derives from the language of the Constitution. Thus, Justice
Breyer’s view of constitutional interpretation would include a
conditional major premise. That major premise could be something
like the following: when interpreting the Constitution, the doctrine
of stare decisis only sometimes fulfills constitutional rationales.
However, if Justice Breyer were to reject such a major premise and
agree that stare decisis must always fulfill and advance
constitutional rationales, then his dissent is logically flawed.

617. Id. at 346.
618. Id. at 354–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
619. See id. (“I have not found [the] burden [to justify a change of
“well-established precedent”] met. Nor do I believe that the other considerations
ordinarily relevant when determining whether to overrule a case are satisfied.”).
620. Id. at 354.
621. See id. (“The matter . . . is not one of first impression, and that fact
makes a substantial difference . . . . Principles of stare decisis must apply . . . .”).
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IV. Why These Weaknesses
Persuasion is a complex process. There are multiple methods
of achieving it and at least as many ways to be unsuccessful. It
would be a dramatic overstatement to claim that all of the less than
optimally persuasive Fourth Amendment opinions from the
Roberts Court share a common cause or cluster of common causes.
However, several of the opinions discussed in this Article appear
to share some connections that may partially explain their weak
persuasive force. These connections also have a rough correlation
to weaknesses in one of the three forms of persuasion Aristotle
identified. Weaknesses in ethos have a common connection related
to the doctrine of stare decisis. Weaknesses in pathos arguments
tend to appear when Justices focus on emotions other than the
emotive touchstones of the Fourth Amendment. In the area of
logically weak arguments, the common cause sometimes can be
traced to what appears to be outcome-oriented logic. In the area of
pathos and logos, weakness appears when a particular outcome in
the case appears to drive the emotive- and logic-based arguments.
The appearance of outcome-based opinion writing arguably
violates a core tenant of classical persuasion—audience
expectation.622
A core element of classical and modern rhetoric is that
advocates are expected to modify their arguments for the audience
they are attempting to persuade.623 Part of that modification turns
on what moves a particular audience, but some of that also turns
on what the audience expects of the speaker.624 Part of the
622. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 148–56 (noting that Aristotle
discusses adapting speeches to the character of the audience); PERELMAN &
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 30 (explaining the need to prepare
speeches with the intended audience in mind); Richard Long, The Role of
Audience in Chaim Perelman's New Rhetoric, 4 J. ADVANCED COMPOSITION 107,
107 (1983) [hereinafter Long, The Role of Audience] (“The rhetor . . . enters into
communion with the audience, and, as a result of subsequent argumentative
techniques, they act together.”).
623. See Long, The Role of Audience, supra note 622 at 107 (“The rhetor
creates a presence by first analyzing how the audience thinks and acts and then
stylistically re-creating the resulting information.”).
624. See ON RHETORIC supra note 40, at 152 (“[A]ll people receive favorably
speeches spoken in their own character and by persons like themselves . . . .”).
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expectation of Supreme Court Justices, or any judge for that
matter, is that they are not partisan.625 As judges use pathos
arguments in a heavy-handed way or logos arguments that appear
ends-oriented, they tend to violate audience expectations.
A. Stare Decisis and Ethos
The Supreme Court has described the doctrine of stare decisis
as of “fundamental importance to the rule of law.”626 Justices like
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer—both having dramatically
different perspectives on constitutional interpretation—have
expressed the need to respect the doctrine.627 Professor Laurence
Tribe described the doctrine as “a resolution to stand by rulings, at
least presumptively, in the face of one’s belief that one probably
would have decided differently.”628
Based on these descriptions, the doctrine of stare decisis is
meant to constrain even the Supreme Court.629 In some instances,
under the pressure from this constraint Justices have reacted in
two ways that result in less persuasive legal opinions. First,
625. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 129 (2009) (“There is a strong presumption
that judges are impartial participants in the legal process . . . . The law presumes
that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.”).
626. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494
(1987).
627. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
153–56 (2011) (discussing the power of stare decisis as arising from public
reliance on precedent); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411–12 (2012) (describing stare decisis as the
“chief barrier against [any] . . . wrenching purge” of established constitutional
doctrine).
628. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 208 (2008).
629. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991) (predicting
chaos if the Supreme Court were to “adopt a low level of deference to precedent”);
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411,
412 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has lauded stare decisis as possessing
fundamental importance to the rule of law, promoting the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, and contributing to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” (citations omitted));
Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Law Making, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
545, 576 (2004) (addressing the significance of stare decisis on judicial
lawmaking).
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Justices proceed timidly, fearful of starting a line of precedent that
is unwise or ending a line of precedent that may be of some use
later.630 Second, Justices misstate precedent, declaring that it
supports their position when it does not or does so weakly.631
Either of these reactions damage the persuasive force of a Justice’s
opinion, and in most instances, are not necessary to carry the
Justice’s argument.
The first tendency described above is for a Justice to resolve
as little as possible in an opinion, thereby providing too little
guidance to courts and law enforcement. The temptation to follow
the minimalist path, especially in the area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, can be strong. Due to the frequency of Fourth
Amendment litigation, both criminal and civil, a poorly
constructed Fourth Amendment opinion often makes itself known
quickly. It took less than eight years for Georgia v. Randolph to be
limited to the narrowest range of influence by Fernandez v.
California,632 and Thornton v. United States633 was clarified, if not
partially overruled, by Arizona v. Gant in even less time.634 The
temptation to decide as little as possible in a Fourth Amendment
opinion is further encouraged by the Court’s “totality of the
circumstances” test for determining reasonableness.635 This sort of
630. See supra Part III.2 (highlighting the tendency of the Supreme Court to
proceed timidly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby leading to a rule
more fluid than concrete).
631. See infra text accompanying notes 637–639 (discussing the tendency of
the Supreme Court to misstate precedent in order to avoid its application to the
facts of the case).
632. See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (“Putting the
exception the Court adopted in Randolph to one side, the lawful occupant of a
house or apartment should have the right to invite police to enter the dwelling
and conduct a search.” (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006))).
633. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
634. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 352 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Justice Stevens acknowledges that an officer-safety rationale cannot justify all
vehicle searches incident to arrest, but asserts that that is not the rule Belton and
Thornton adopted (As described above, I read those cases differently).” (citing
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004))).
635. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (establishing totality of
circumstances as the proper probable cause test because “probable cause is a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules”).
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test lends itself naturally to a case-by-case approach to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.636 The overly cautious approach can
lead to a failure to commit to a particular rule in evaluation of a
Fourth Amendment question, choosing a rule that is so narrowly
tailored it only affects cases with virtually the same facts, or a
refusal to end precedent that no longer has viability. The
temptations are counterbalanced by adverse persuasive effects of
the overly cautious approach. Opinions like Justice Kennedy’s in
Quon and Justice Alito’s in Jones leave or would leave law
enforcement and lower courts at a loss for determining how the
Court intends they resolve related Fourth Amendment questions.
Decisions like Justice Souter’s in Randolph are so narrow that if
the facts of a future case do not match nearly exactly to the
precedent, lower courts are still unsure how to proceed. The
primary harm to an opinion’s persuasive force is seen in the area
of practical wisdom.
The second tendency is for Justices to overstate or misstate a
line of precedent or to seek to avoid the application of the precedent
through a factual characterization of the case. This approach
reveals just how powerful the pull of stare decisis can be. In
opinions like Justice Scalia’s Jones majority,637 Justice Thomas’s
dissent in Rodriguez,638 and Justice Stevens’s majority in
Caballes,639 the holes in the use of precedent are readily apparent
and often commented on at length by dissenting and concurring
opinions. These deficiencies undercut the credibility of the
Justice’s opinion and thereby the persuasive force of the opinion’s
ethos. In the context of a Supreme Court opinion, it can be
forcefully argued that an opinion that lacks adequate ethos is an
opinion of little value.
One possible explanation for the tendency to misstate or
overstate a line of precedent comes from a challenge inherent in
the diversity of the Court’s judicial philosophies. Stare decisis
636. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (“No judicial opinion can
comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge
the facts of the case before us.”).
637. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
638. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
639. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
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binds, to a degree, future Supreme Courts regardless of the
modality of interpretation the Court utilizes when establishing the
precedent.640 Thus, a committed originalist may be forced to build
off of precedent that a committed realist established, and vice
versa. The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has famously
been called “a crazy quilt.”641 The tendency to have some
disharmony in jurisprudence must be expected, especially when
the Justices writing the opinions do so from very different
philosophies.
B. Audience Expectation and Judicial Advocacy
In addition to identifying three core components of rhetoric,
Aristotle also advocated that any act of persuasion should be
tailored to fit the audience to which it is being presented.642 Most
systematic approaches to persuasion place a special emphasis on
the role of the audience. The sophists, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero
all included a focus on the audience, as do modern rhetorical
theorists.643
In The New Rhetoric, Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca
asserted that audience awareness is central to persuasion.644 They
640. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015)
(discussing stare decisis as “a foundation stone of . . . law;” it is ‘more important
that the . . . law be settled than that it be settled right.’” (citing Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932))).
641. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK xix, xxii (2d ed., 2015).
642. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 148–56 (noting that Aristotle
discusses adapting speeches to the character of the audience).
643. See id. at 148 (“In Plato’s Phaedrus . . . Socrates argues that there cannot
be a true art of speech without a knowledge of the soul (psykh), enabling a speaker
to fit the appropriate argument to the soul of the hearer.”); PERELMAN &
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 20 (discussing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as well
as Cicero’s proclamation to speak differently to the “coarse and ignorant” class of
men than to “that other, enlightened and cultivated” class (quoting CICERO,
PARTITIONES ORATORIAE § 90)); id. at 319, 495 (discussing the tendency of the
sophists to focus on their prestige to gain the respect of the audience, as well as
their tightly structured speeches designed to guide the audience).
644. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 6–7 (“What we
preserve of the traditional rhetoric is the idea of the audience, an idea
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proposed that audiences can be divided into a variety of groups:
self, interlocutor, particular, and universal.645 The audience of the
self, as the category’s title implies, means to persuade oneself.646
The interlocutor is a single individual a speaker would address “in
a dialogue.”647 A particular audience is that group of individuals
who the author is directing a particular type of persuasion
toward.648 The universal audience is a theoretical construct.649 If
the universal audience existed, the illusory “reasonable men” and
“reasonable women” described throughout the various disciplines
of U.S. law would populate it.650 The universal audience is moved
primarily by reason.651 The particular audience is affected by other
influences, such as personal emotion, preexisting opinions, and
values.652 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that by
envisioning how to persuade the universal audience and then

immediately evoked by the mere thought of a speech. Every speech is addressed
to an audience and it is frequently forgotten that this applies to everything
written as well.”).
645. See id. at 20, 30–31 (highlighting several kinds of audience: the
“universal audience;” the “interlocutor,” a “particular audience,” and “the subject
himself”).
646. See id. at 40 (discussing the audience of self, or the “self-deliberating”
audience).
647. Id. at 30.
648. See id. at 31, 39–40 (discussing the interlocutor and the particular
audience, as well as the general tendency to tailor an argument based on the
particular audience).
649. See id. at 20–21 (“Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms
of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises taken for
granted without hesitation: these views form an integral part of its culture, and
an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt
himself to it.”).
650. See id. at 32 (“Thus, maximally efficacious rhetoric, in the case of a
universal audience, is rhetoric employing nothing but logical proof.”); Alan D.
Miller & Ronan Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325–26
(2012) (defining the “reasonable person.”).
651. PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 510, at 32 (“Argumentation
addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the reasons
adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an
absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or historical contingencies.”).
652. See id. at 13–17 (discussing the need for a “contact of the minds” in order
to facilitate effective discourse).
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adapting that argument to a particular audience, an advocate can
create an effective argument.653
One of the challenges the Justices of the Supreme Court face
when writing persuasive opinions is the diversity of their audience.
Although the “universal audience” as described in The New
Rhetoric does not exist, the Supreme Court’s audience is perhaps
closer to that ideal than the audiences for other political
performative utterances. The Justices of the Court can be confident
that their Fourth Amendment opinions will be read by their fellow
justices, federal and state court judges, and lawyers who practice
in the area affected by the opinion.654 Depending on the opinion,
the Justices must be prepared to have their opinions read by
laypeople, the media, and politicians—in short, everyone and
anyone in the United States. In this way, Supreme Court decisions
are not unlike some speeches made by the President or the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. Supreme Court opinions,
however, must persuade future audiences as well.655 The nature of
the common law and the Court’s jurisprudence in general is that
today’s majority opinion may be tomorrow’s dissent, and vice versa.
Thus, the Supreme Court is called upon to address a widely diverse
audience that is affected by the opinions and values of today, and
the audience of tomorrow; particularly the Supreme Court justices
of tomorrow, whose opinions and values are unknown.656
Because the Justices of the Supreme Court are called upon to
write persuasive opinions for today and tomorrow, they must
balance Aristotle’s components of rhetoric with special care. This
suggests that the Justices avoid tethering their opinions too closely
to transitory opinions or values. Opinions should be weighted
toward enduring judicial values because the Court’s audience

653. See id. at 19–47 (discussing the three audience groups and their
relationships to one another generally in the construction of an argument).
654. See Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 667, 688 (2015) [hereinafter Berger, The Rhetoric] (listing “lower
courts, governmental officials, parties, lawyers, law students, law professors . . . ,
the media, the general public, and more” as audiences).
655. See id. (including “future Justices” as an audience).
656. Id.
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expects judicial opinions to demonstrate those values.657 Of
particular concern is when a Justice appears outcome-oriented.
Recently Professor Eric Berger published an article that
examines the rise of what he calls “The Rhetoric of Constitutional
Absolutism.”658 In the Article, Professor Berger explains that
“constitutional absolutism” is the tendency of Justices of today’s
Supreme Court to “pretend that answers are obvious.”659 Professor
Berger has suggested the rise of absolutism can be connected to
strategic goals of the Justices,660 internal Court mechanisms,661
and psychological factors like the natural tendency for Justices to
revert to the role of advocate.662 It is Professor Berger’s last
suggestion that I will discuss.
The desire to win an argument is a powerful motivator for
human beings. Aristotle’s work on rhetoric notes that persuasion
is an activity that humans engage in everyday in all manner of
things.663 Attorneys have been educated in persuasion and have
often spent much of their professional lives perfecting the art and
science of convincing an audience. Each of the Justices on the
Supreme Court is a skilled attorney who has risen to the heights
of the profession.664 The publicity of the argument can accentuate
the natural human desire to win an argument.665 The more eyes
657. See id. at 734 (asserting that “judges should explain their opinions with
‘reasoned elaboration’”).
658. Id. at 667.
659. Id. at 673.
660. See id. at 699 (referring to the “demosprudential” aims of Justices in the
crafting of opinions).
661. See id. at 709 (discussing existing judicial and political structures that
influence the crafting of Supreme Court opinions).
662. See id. at 716, 725 (discussing the psychological tendency to act and write
as an advocate).
663. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 40, at 30 (“Rhetoric . . . [is] within the
knowledge of all people . . . . [A]ll people, in some way, share in [rhetoric].”).
664. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.supreme
court.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (listing the sitting
Supreme Court Justices and their individual legal experience) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
665. See Berger, The Rhetoric, supra note 654, at 723 (“[T]he writing process
sometimes subconsciously leads a writer towards rhetorical absolutism as she
tries to defend an outcome as persuasively as possible.”).
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watching, the more an individual’s ego is a factor. Because the
legal academic community, lower court judges, and the media
dissect and discuss every opinion Supreme Court Justices issue,
the personal stakes can be high.666
The desire to “win” may influence a Justice to use a
pathos-based argument that resonated with them personally, but
in doing so, the Justice excites emotions disconnected with the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s use of an emotive
argument in Maryland v. King illustrates this point.667 The
emotions Justice Kennedy evokes are empathy for the victim and
outrage toward the defendant, but those emotions are fairly beside
the Fourth Amendment point.
The desire to win can also impact a Justice’s logic-based
arguments. It has long been recognized that correct facts are not
necessary for a logical syllogism to be formally correct.668 Professor
David Zaresky has offered the following example: all heavenly
bodies are made of cheese, the moon is a heavenly body, and thus
the moon is made of cheese.669 From a strict form perspective the
above syllogism is correct.670 So, a syllogism can be used to give any
argument the appearance of validity.671 Further, how an advocate
crafts the major premise of the syllogism is often determinative of
the syllogism’s outcome. The selection of such a major premise,
which demands a particular outcome, appears less a tool of valid
logical analysis than a tool of advocacy.
As Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca all
acknowledge, persuasion ought to be tailored to a particular
audience.672 In the context of the Supreme Court, most of the
666. This does not include the weight that history must also place on a Justice
when writing an opinion. Justices like Marshall, Holmes, Story, Frankfurter,
Brandeis, and Cardozo are well known and nearly revered.
667. See supra notes 401–404 and accompanying text (detailing the use of
pathos in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Maryland v. King).
668. See Audio tape: DAVID ZAREFSKY, ARGUMENTATION: THE STUDY OF
EFFECTIVE REASONING lecture 3 (2d ed., Teaching Company 2005) (illustrating
how categorical syllogisms, which contain statements that relate different
categories to one another, need only consist of two premises and a conclusion).
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. See supra notes 642–643 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
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audience has a general expectation of how Justices should present
their opinions. These expectations have been created and
developed over the life of the United States. They are manifest in
our symbols of judicial power and authority and the art that adorns
the Supreme Court itself. Judges are expected to be balanced,
without personal agenda, and demonstrate “reasoned
elaboration”673 in their written opinions.674 This is not to say
Justices should not advocate a position—rather it is to emphasize
that they must advocate in a particular way or risk violating the
expectations of their audience.
V. Conclusion
The Fourth Amendment opinions of the Justices of the Roberts
Court are, at their core, advocacy pieces. Through their opinions,
Justices are called upon to convince their audience that they have
done justice to the parties involved in a dispute, established a wise
rule for future application, and extolled the virtues of the Fourth
Amendment while condemning the vices that threaten it. These
demands are high and quite arguably unrealistic. The only way
that Justices can achieve this goal is through effective use of all
the components of persuasion: appeals to credibility, emotion, and
logic. These appeals must be tempered by the cultural expectations
of judicial opinions issued by the Supreme Court. Those cultural
expectations become part of the expectations of the Court’s
audience. Thus, persuasive Supreme Court decisions not only use
appeals to emotion, logic, and credibility, but they do so in an
apparently balanced, judicious fashion.

tailor rhetoric to the intended audience).
673. Berger, The Rhetoric, supra note 654, at 736.
674. See supra note 625 and accompanying text (describing the role of judges
as nonbiased third-party arbiters).

